5 European integration, Asian subordination

U.S. identity and power in two regions

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Introduction

While Europe is stitched together by strong, multilateral institutions of economic and security cooperation, Asia is almost a reverse image. There is, for example, no formal, regional agreement promoting trade and investment among China, Japan, and South Korea – the three largest economies in the region. And there is no multilateral security pact between the important states there. This difference reflects, in large measure, divergent approaches to regionalism on the part of the U.S., which is not only a global superpower but a regional hegemon in Europe and Asia with a longstanding capacity, willingness, and vision to lead in both places.[1]

American officials used the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II to prod old enemies like France and West Germany to collaborate on rebuilding their ravaged economies. And they established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multistate military bloc designed to deter Soviet aggression in Europe.

In Asia, by contrast, the U.S. insisted on occupying a central position in commercial and military relations. It gave large amounts of bilateral aid to capitalist allies, and – with the exception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an anti-communist bloc – opposed fledging regional institutions that did not include the U.S. This position has remained constant. For example, in 1990, when the prime minister of Malaysia called for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) made up of ASEAN members along with Japan, China, and South Korea, the U.S. blasted the proposal as exclusionary. EAEG's leading member, Japan, demurred and the proposed organization became a largely irrelevant "caucus." And in 1997, when Japan called for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to bail out fiscally distressed economies in the region, the U.S. again protested loudly. It worried that the AMF would undermine the International Monetary Fund, a global but Washington-based organization controlled by the U.S.[2] Japan bowed to U.S. pressure and abandoned its idea.

For regional security, American officials have insisted on maintaining a set of bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (at least until

1979, when it finally established diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China), and the Philippines. The U.S. military directs each of these alliances. This hub-and-spokes pattern also sets Asia apart from Europe, where states are united in a multilateral defense alliance.

Thus far, I have established only that the U.S. has been a major (perhaps *the* major) force shaping these two different outcomes. The more fundamental, and more difficult, question facing us is this: why did the U.S. pursue divergent strategies in Europe and Asia? That is, why did it adopt such a Janus-faced approach to regionalism? In this chapter, I present a hybrid argument – part constructivist and part realist – to suggest that cultural identity and political power account for the American pursuit of multilateralism in Europe and bilateralism in Asia. U.S. officials felt a cultural affinity, even a racial identity, with Europeans, and thus trusted them to collaborate on economic and security affairs. In addition, the U.S. had never enjoyed asymmetrical power over that region. It was content to exercise a relatively flat hegemony *across* a connected Europe. By contrast, American leaders felt no such affinity for or identity with Asians, whom they viewed as "backwards" or inferior. They did not trust their counterparts across the Pacific to manage their own affairs. Plus, they had dominated different parts of Asia for decades. So they insisted on playing a central role in almost all regional economic organizations, and – on defense – opted for a hierarchical hub-and-spokes system of mostly bilateral defense alliances.[3] As a result, the U.S. was able to maintain a steep hegemony based on disproportionate power *over* other states in the region. This is not to suggest that Asian leaders have been puppets of the grand marionette in D.C. But on the most contentious issues, they have not enjoyed much autonomy.

This chapter presents the two claims separately and then fuses them in a conclusion. It does so with the presumption that constructivism and realism are not contradictory but can in fact complement one another, with the former emphasizing cultural norms (the ideas, values, and beliefs that constitute a community's identity) and the latter emphasizing power (the capacity of a dominant or influential state to compel other states to act in the former's interest, or perhaps realign their interests to accommodate the former).[4] The first section draws heavily on the work of Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), who say they are "analytically eclectic" but are primarily constructivist in orientation. The second section is influenced by realism, especially the critical realism of Beeson (2005).

The civilized and the backward

Europe: a brother to Uncle Sam

The U.S. is increasingly multicultural, but white Americans (whom we could, but usually do not, describe as "European-Americans") still tend to see themselves as "normal" Americans. They continue to identify unconsciously with the Mother Continent. The national museum on Ellis Island, New York,

proudly chronicles the role of the U.S. as a "distant magnet" for immigrants from Europe. One has to study the exhibits much more closely to learn anything about the unwilling visitors who came on slave ships from Africa, the refugees from conflict zones in Asia, especially Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, or the more recent and even higher tide of immigrants who fled north from Latin America. The genocide of Native Americans is mostly forgotten there.

One might also say, using geo-cultural rather than racial terms, that white Americans reflexively align themselves with "the West" or "Western Civilization." They fancy themselves members of a complex, but mostly mythical lineage extending from the Mediterranean to Western Europe to the New World.[5]

In fact, of course, this cultural solidarity, or Occidentalism, is relatively new. It didn't always include the Irish, who escaped poverty and famine in the mid-19th century to find work on railroads and in factories in a sprawling, industrializing America. Those "bog trotters" or "Paddies" were not "real" or "normal" Americans in those days; they faced fierce hostility from earlier settlers who were predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Later, as the century turned, immigrants from southern, central, and eastern Europe – Italians, Poles, and Russian Jews – suffered similar discrimination, even though they, too, eventually became "white" and "Western." Congress responded to these rolling waves of humanity by imposing restrictions designed to freeze the ethnic composition of the U.S. In 1924, it went further to defend a threatened racial homogeneity, severely curtailing immigration by Africans and flatly banning immigration by Arabs and Asians. That legislation was encouraged by U.S. social scientists, including Raymond Leslie Buell (1923: 307), who argued that Japanese in-migration, if left unchecked, would "wipe out American standards of living, eventually reduce us to the economic level of the Oriental, and implant an alien and half-breed race on our soil that might make the negro problem look white."[6]

Occidentalism emerged gradually. It first expressed itself in the late 19th century through the writings of Social Darwinists like John Fiske. The influential historian, who lectured for a time at Harvard, trumpeted the "Manifest Destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race," and suggested that continental Europe had become weakened by "Asiaticization," the assimilation of inferior races (barbarians). Fiske (1885: viii–ix) argued that the U.S. had the best racial stock on earth, and had a natural duty to flex its muscles and expand – just as England had done. "The [Anglo-Saxon] race which gained control of North America must become the dominant race in the world, and its political ideas must prevail in the struggle for life." Racism thus informed foreign policy as the U.S. emulated European states and became an imperialist power, declaring its commercial influence over Latin America through the Monroe Doctrine and by establishing colonial mastery over territories like Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

During World War I, political and business elites in the U.S. came to distinguish themselves from what they viewed as quasi-Asiatic "barbarians,"

including the central European "Huns."[7] President Woodrow Wilson, for example, spoke acidly of "hyphenated Americans," especially German-Americans, who might not be completely loyal to the U.S. In 1917, the U.S. entered the war on the side of Western Europe (and, by extension, Russia), propelled at least in part by concern over the fate of longtime allies with which it culturally identified. That is, Americans felt greater affinity for (and less threat from) those nations. Stephen Walt uses this case to defend his heterodox or "balance of threat" realism, noting that, contrary to the prediction of structural realism, the U.S. teamed up with Great Britain and France, even though they possessed greater material resources than their enemies, Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Over time, "Western" identity came to function as a counterpoint to "Eastern" ideologies like Bolshevism and anarchism. In 1919 and 1920, the federal government rounded up and deported hundreds of immigrants, especially Russians, associated with the radical labor movement. The Palmer raids linked anti-communism and nativism in a campaign to "purify the body politic against foreign invasion" (Jackson 2006: 156).

Like World War I, World War II in Europe does not conform neatly to a cultural narrative in that the U.S. joined forces with an "Eastern" power (the Soviet Union) as well as traditionally "Western" powers like the U.K. But American leaders drew on Occidental tropes to rally the troops. President Roosevelt called the invasion of Normandy an effort to preserve "our civilization," and General Eisenhower told allied forces they were engaging in a "Great Crusade" on behalf of "liberty-loving people everywhere." In these and other rhetorical flourishes, U.S. elites ignored the inconvenient fact that they were allied with a brutal dictator (Stalin).

It was during the Cold War, of course, that the West-East divide became reified with the drawing of what Churchill called an "Iron Curtain" across Europe, and the building of the Berlin Wall. In 1945, American elites looked across the Atlantic and saw – for the second time in a half-century – a region in tatters. They felt deep sympathy for their brothers and sisters on the continent. In the emerging superpower rivalry with the USSR, the U.S. closely identified with West European states, including a defeated one that had been led by a fascist party and organized around a murderous ideology of ultra-nationalism. It viewed its allies (old and new) as "responsible" even if junior partners in a global capitalist order. So the U.S. used diplomacy and dollars to encourage regional cooperation that began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and continued through the Maastricht Treaty. And it forged a multilateral security alliance designed to contain Soviet communism.

In their early Cold War discourse, U.S. elites routinely touted a "common civilization" or longstanding "community" of shared ideals and interests that linked their newer nation to "The Old World." For example, in promoting the NATO treaty, U.S. diplomat W. Averell Harriman told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1949 that "there is a spiritual emotion about this which is hard to overemphasize … free men are standing shoulder to shoulder."[8]

An otherwise vocal critic of the Truman administration's overall foreign policy, Walter Lippmann (1947: 24–25), referred to European members of the proposed "Atlantic community" as "natural allies of the United States" who shared "the common traditions of western Christendom, and their economic, political, legal, and moral institutions which, with all their variations and differences, have a common origin and have been shaped by much the same historic experience."[9]

Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton was more explicit. He testified to Congress that prospective members of NATO should share American "ideals of freedom" and be "composed of the white race."[10]

As Jackson (2006: 133) notes, the project of rebuilding the region, and especially West Germany, was steeped in discourse about "western civilization," a white, Christian transnational community that encompassed both Europeans and Americans. He quotes James Eastland, the Mississippi Democrat, who told his Senate colleagues in December 1945 that the U.S. was bound by a civilizational duty to take more aggressive measures to help Europe recover from the ravages of war:

> It is not to the interest of America that oriental, atheistic philosophies prevail in the heart of Europe, the cradle of Western Civilization; and yet, if these policies are pursued, this will be the result, to the grave detriment of America.

Jackson documents how rapidly U.S. elites, not just Eastland, moved to add West Germany to their inventory of "The West," casting the Soviet Union even more starkly as an eastern "other." This became clear in their marketing of the $17.6 billion scheme to help European allies rebuild their devastated economies. U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, the architect of the bailout plan, used this language in pleading to Congress:

> There is convincing evidence that the peoples of western Europe want to preserve their free society and the heritage that we share with them. To make that choice conclusive they need our assistance. It is in the American tradition to help. In helping them we will be helping ourselves – because in the larger sense our national interests coincide with those of a free and prosperous Europe.
>
> (Senate 1950: 1277; quoted in Jackson (2006: 161))

The West vs. East meme persisted throughout the Cold War. In fact, it reached a new height of discursive bravado in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, who castigated the Soviet Union as "the evil empire" and called upon Americans to embrace "the self-evident truths of Western civilization" that "have been passed down like precious heirlooms from generation to generation since the generations began."[11] These consisted of various political liberties, Reagan proclaimed. In this grandiose formulation, Russians

were not potential allies momentarily pressed under the thumb of a communist regime; they represented a horde, perhaps a Slavic horde, of the perpetually unfree.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, one might have expected the edifice of "the West" to crumble, too. But this trans-Atlantic identity survived even what Francis Fukuyama saluted as "the end of history" – the triumph of liberalism (democracy and capitalism) over authoritarianism. A new non-Western "other" soon emerged. Sometimes it was called "Radical Islam"; sometimes it was called "Political Islam"; and sometimes it was just called "Islam." In the U.S., an oppositional stance was pushed by virulently anti-Muslim organizations like the American Freedom Defense Initiative and viciously anti-Muslim publications like "Jihad Watch." Some U.S. academics used more sophisticated discourse to advance this framing. For example, in a seminal analysis of contemporary international relations, Samuel Huntington (1996) claimed the world was embroiled in a "clash of civilizations," where the pivotal conflict pitted "The West" against "The Rest" (and especially traditional Islamic culture). As before, white Americans viewed Europeans as allies, next of kin, in an existential struggle to preserve "Western Civilization."

This pattern continues. When terrorists blow up buildings in Baghdad or Nairobi, Americans tend to shrug. Violence against brown and black people may be sad, but it feels somehow normal or at least acceptable. Those people come from what President Trump calls "shithole countries." But when terrorists attack white cartoonists in Paris, Americans tend to react passionately. They are moved to change their Facebook profiles to the French flag and post memes declaring "Je Suis Charlie." Empathy reigns.

Asia: the less "civilized" child

American elites have never felt such kinship with Asia. This is not to say they have never felt a close connection to that region. In fact, the U.S. has often behaved as though it faces a kind of *noblesse oblige* to instruct, civilize, and, as I argue below, rule the region.

In the American imagination, Asians (or "Orientals") tend to be children, not peers. They might be cute, or perhaps exotic, but they are generally immature and less "civilized." They are beneath or behind Westerners. Racism informs this attitude toward what many have called (eurocentrically) "The Far East," a region that is actually west of the U.S. and that includes important U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand.

This has been evident at different moments of history. For example, while they claimed to be "liberating" Filipinos from the yoke of Spanish colonialism, U.S. officials used a narrative inspired by what one historian (Miller 1982: 134) has called "paternalist racism" to justify their decision to retain control of the islands for half a century. William Howard Taft, who was the first governor-general of that U.S. colony before becoming president, told

Congress in 1902 that "our little brown brothers" in the Philippines would need "fifty or 100 years" of American tutelage before they acquired "anything resembling Anglo-Saxon political principles and skills."[12] The natives, he argued, were "utterly unfit for self-governance," but could be subdued and managed "as we govern the Indian tribes."[13] In a similar tone, Franklin Delano Roosevelt used to talk about the "brown people of the East" who, like all children, require the supervision of more mature "trustees" (Hunt 1987: 162–164).

At about the same time, the U.S. began to view itself as the patron of China, which it came to regard as perilously fragile and in need of American patronage. The U.S. first pushed an "open door" policy toward that country, hoping to keep any single great power from gaining political control (while ensuring large U.S. corporations economic access to a promising Chinese market). In 1915, Washington ordered Tokyo to roll back its "21 Demands" on China, which had been designed to consolidate Japanese power there. And in 1940, it imposed an embargo on exports of oil and scrap iron to Japan, protesting Tokyo's escalating war of aggression against China.

All of this reflected paternalism, or what Thomson, Stanley, and Curtis (1981) call "sentimental imperialism" – an almost religious zeal to protect and promote (or, as some suggested, "civilize") Asia, especially China, while also dominating it. Although American support for this policy was widespread, it was perhaps strongest among a group of Republican politicians, Christian missionaries, Asia-oriented business people, and Western and Midwestern pundits who became known, pejoratively, as the "China Lobby." Henry Luce, born to U.S. missionaries in China, emerged as the titular head of this informal grouping and exercised tremendous influence on U.S. policy as the publisher of *Time* Magazine. He fell in love with Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt and otherwise unpopular regime, which he referred to as "Free China" as opposed to Mao Zedong's "Red China." Luce and fellow Sino-philes seemed especially fond of Chiang's wife, featured on the cover of *Time* three times. She was an elegant and charming woman who studied English at Wellesley and conjured up fantasies (and stereotypes) among American men about "Oriental beauty." In 1943, when nationalists and communists were putatively united in fighting Japanese imperialism, she spoke to an enraptured U.S. Congress as well as a live audience of 17,000 at Madison Square Garden. Madame Chiang's speeches were broadcast live on radio to millions more across America.

Americans, according to Thompson (1967: 56), had become obsessed with mainland China, much like a wealthy patron becomes fixated on a needy client.

> No other nation in Asia had been on the receiving end of so much American goodwill … We admired Chinese culture, liked the Chinese people, delighted in Chinese food, and deplored China's patent incapacity for effective self-government. China made us feel good: it fed our sense of benevolence and moral superiority.

But in 1949, the Communist Party won the civil war and captured Beijing. Bewildered and even devastated, U.S. elites blamed one another for "losing" China, as though it had been a child running away from its parent. For the next three decades, they doted on their remaining, Mandarin-speaking dependent – the Republic of China (Taiwan).

U.S. political elites frequently referred to Asians with condescension and even outright contempt. These were not "natural allies." For example, an internal U.S. State Department memo from regional planner Charlton Ogburn (1953: 262) flatly proclaimed that "… we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferiors." Likewise, General Douglas MacArthur famously said that the Japanese, "measured by the standards of modern civilization … would be like a boy of twelve compared with our development of 45 years."[14] (By contrast, he claimed that the Germans were "quite as mature" as the Americans.)[15] In a conversation with a friend, American diplomat Dean Acheson apparently explained his opposition to staying the course in Vietnam by saying "too much blood already has been spilled for those little people just out of trees."[16]

Political elites weren't unique in making such racist remarks. Scholars, too, frequently resorted to the teleological logic of modernization theory to describe the region's presumed backwardness. Kenneth Young (1965: 45) was just one of many writers who believed Asia was still in the midst of a painful process of becoming more "developed."

> The ancient-modern societies, states or nations of Asia are going through a cycle of political and social metabolism in their struggle for development and modernization. There is a constant interaction of build up and break down in the political-social-psychological sphere at the local level of the countryside and the city level of urban aggregation.

Beckman (1962: preface) was more explicit. Unlike its giant neighbor, Japan managed to modernize or develop, he wrote, "because Japanese feudal society was receptive to innovations based on Western ideas and institutions, [while] China, on the other hand, resisted change …"

During the Cold War, American scholars celebrated the fact that the U.S., which called itself the "Leader of the Free World," was available to help Asian countries through this messy process of development, a process of "growing up" or becoming "civilized." As Harvard Sinologist John Fairbank (1966: 124) told Congress, Americans uniquely understand that "contact, open society, pluralism, the international trading world" are the most effective means of modernizing.

Fairbank did not mention violence, but Americans came to view this, too, as sometimes a necessary tool for fostering "civilization" in Asia. Fighting in Vietnam, U.S. troops often referred to the Vietnamese, both their enemies in the North and their supposed allies in the South, as "gooks" – a derogatory

term that was used first during the Philippines-American war and later in Korea. The jungle, these soldiers implied, was filled with uncivilized, savage peoples. Baritz (1985: 37) notes that Americans referred to dangerous areas in Vietnam as "Indian country," and a U.S. veteran of the My Lai massacre reported that American soldiers took scalps – "like from Indians" (Drinnon 1990: 456–457).

Although American troops long ago exited Vietnam, thousands remain in South Korea and Japan – a fact that upsets some host country citizens, especially residents near U.S. military bases who complain about noise, pollution, accidents, prostitution, and more than a trivial loss of sovereignty. In response to these complaints, American officials sometimes sound like grumpy parents. At other times, they adopt racialized rhetoric to criticize their hosts.

For example, in 2003, a Pentagon official noted that South Korea relies heavily on the U.S. for its military security, and perhaps should begin to do more on its own. "It's like teaching a child how to ride a bike," the official grumbled. "We've been running alongside South Korea, holding on to its handlebars for 50 years. At some point you have to let go."[17]

In December 2010, the head of the U.S. State Department's Japan Desk expressed frustration with anti-base agitators in Okinawa, the sparsely populated set of southern islands that hosts a majority of American soldiers in Japan. He allegedly referred to Okinawans as "masters of extortion" for demanding compensation for the environmental and social impacts of the U.S. military. This official apparently also dubbed Okinawa "the Puerto Rico of Japan," suggesting that its thankless residents have "darker skin" than their counterparts on the main islands and that they are "lazy."[18]

Military minders are not the only Americans who haughtily look down on Asians. The 45th president of the U.S. referred to the leader of North Korea as "Little Rocket Man," characterizing him as a petulant child. Donald Trump later suggested that the U.S. might have to "totally destroy" that country, much like it wiped out Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. There is little empathy here.

Leadership and domination

Europe: American hegemony

For a very long time, the modern world was multipolar. The U.S. was a major power, but it shared that status with states like France, Germany, England, Japan, and the Soviet Union. It was not until 1945 that the U.S. clearly could be viewed as the world's one and only superpower. It emerged from World War II with economic and military supremacy, having built manufacturing industries that could produce steel and chemicals, autos and ships for its own market and for export markets, and having created the most powerful land, naval and air force ever seen in history. It controlled nearly half of the world's

gold and reserve currencies. It was the only nuclear power, and possessed more than 100 aircraft carriers – twice as many as Britain, the only other country with a sizeable fleet.

But despite its overwhelming power, the U.S. did not treat Europe imperiously. Even before the war ended, the U.S. was collaborating with the U.K. on a redesign of the global financial architecture. Bretton Woods, the new regime established in 1944, was a joint Anglo-American project, though it cannot be denied that John Maynard Keynes, the British economist, played second fiddle to his American counterpart, Harry Dexter White, in negotiations over the dollar standard. The U.S. also worked closely with five European allies (the U.K., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), plus Canada and Australia, in laying the foundation for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. On military matters, too, the U.S. emerged as a leader, but did not try to dictate. Lundestad (2003: 49), for example, notes that European officials, especially British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, took the first steps in launching NATO. In the early 1950s, alarmed by the prospect of Soviet expansionism, officials in Western Europe also pushed Washington to dramatically expand U.S. troop deployments on the continent.[19]

This is why Lundestad suggests that American hegemony in Europe was a case of "empire by invitation," rather than empire by imposition. The Marshall Plan, which led to regional schemes for economic integration, would not have come about "if the Europeans had not wanted it," he writes (p. 59). The same goes for the military alliance: "Considering Washington's initially lukewarm response to Bevin's pleas for an Atlantic security system, it seems likely that the setting up of NATO would at least have been substantially delayed if it had not been for the European invitations."

With one important exception, European allies have chosen to bandwagon with, rather than balance against, U.S. hegemony.[20] This is only surprising if one relies on a mechanical calculation mapping state resources onto interests. European states came to enjoy both peace and prosperity via trans-Atlantic cooperation. And they rarely had to comply with unwelcome directives from Washington, which exercised what Ikenberry (2001) calls "strategic restraint" – especially in its dealings with Europe.

In 1945, when the fighting finally ended, the U.S. had an overriding strategic interest in Europe. It wanted a friendly and more united zone of stability, a region that would not reboil, ensnaring the U.S. in yet another violent conflict. So it promised a massive plan to rebuild economies in ruin. Access to bailout funds came with only one condition: recipient countries had to demonstrate they could collaborate through the new Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which would administer the reconstruction dollars.

Before long, the U.S. interest in "Team Europe" acquired a new urgency. The Soviet Union was extending its reach across eastern and even central Europe, where communist leaders seized power in places like Budapest and pro-Moscow insurgencies threatened to do the same in places like Athens. Indeed, pro-communist regimes soon forged a Warsaw Pact under the

Kremlin's leadership. The U.S. quickly tweaked its trans-Atlantic plan. It no longer wanted just a zone of stability; it now sought an economically prosperous and militarily powerful region, a strong, capitalist bloc that could stand together and halt what it presumed to be Moscow's ambition: westward expansion.

The U.S. leaned on West Germany's neighbors to accept the incipient state's economic and political recovery. It pushed Paris especially hard because it realized that, without a Franco-German rapprochement, "there will be no possibility of peace in Europe" and it could not achieve its vision of a pro-American union of European states.[21] Unsurprisingly, the French, having suffered a century-long string of Teutonic conquests, initially resisted. But they were compelled (or, according to revisionist historians like Hitchcock (1998), "induced") to abandon a policy of dominating Bonn and embrace a collaborative approach reflected first in Schuman's call for the ECSC. The 1951 Treaty of Paris was a giant leap toward regional integration, establishing most of the institutions that eventually would constitute the European Union. At the same time, the U.S. pulled its European allies, along with Canada, into a trans-Atlantic military alliance to combat Soviet aggression.

With prodding from the U.S., NATO expanded in 1954 to include West Germany, which was so eager to repair its reputation that it accepted a number of conditions on its entry.[22] Under these conditions, which were demanded by France and brokered by the U.S., the new member of the alliance agreed that it would not reestablish a general staff for its armed forces; it would leave its air defense system under NATO command even during peacetime; it would curb its ability to independently produce powerful weapons; and it would allow the United Stations to maintain troops on its territory (Gould and Krasner 2003: 63–65). West Germany thus became more firmly embedded in a multilateral framework that satisfied European concerns about a possible resurgence of German power, a framework that bound the region together more tightly than ever.

The Treaty of Rome followed, turning the ECSC into the European Economic Community, a customs union that encouraged freer trade among members of the region. Nearly three decades later, the Single European Act built on this foundation by seeking to harmonize regulations. Throughout this period, West Germany demonstrated a credible commitment to the deepening of European integration. In the late 1980s, as the Cold War waned, it even championed the idea of a common currency (the Euro) to replace the badly strained European Monetary System, which had allowed its own Bundesbank to emerge as the de facto central bank of Europe. West Germany's commitment to regionalism, its so-called "Europatriotism," eased its neighbors' longstanding fears and weakened opposition to German reunification, which came about rather suddenly in 1990.

But none of this could have happened without U.S. support. From the outset of the Cold War, Washington dedicated itself to rebuilding Europe

through multilateralism. It energetically sought to check Soviet power without overextending itself.

This proactive position was outlined in a 1949 briefing paper (p. 134) by the U.S. State Department's Office of German and Austrian Affairs:

> So long as we are occupying Germany, and particularly in view of our insistence on a controlling voice in German foreign economic matters, we have a direct responsibility for action in Europe. Furthermore, any movement toward strengthening Europe and resolving the German problem would further the objectives of the North Atlantic Pact. Such a movement will need all the impetus that can be given it […]

It is true, of course, that American enthusiasm for the European project has flagged from time to time, especially in the post–Cold War era, when economic concerns have regained their salience. The U.S. has, for example, complained about Europe's protection of farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy, and its export subsidies for Airbus. But since Washington employs similar trade policies, its criticism has never been too loud – until perhaps recently.

On the security front, the U.S. has continued to support a multilateral approach, especially with its political investment in NATO. Not only did the "Western" alliance survive the collapse of the Soviet Union, it actually expanded to include former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as Baltic and Balkan states. The U.S. pushed for enlargement to its current roster of 30 members; and it routinely encouraged joint leadership. In the late 1990s, the alliance led a campaign of "humanitarian bombing" against Serbia to aid Muslim separatists in Kosovo. U.S. General Wesley Clark was the NATO commander at the time, but he relied heavily on a multilateral committee of generals chaired by Klaus Naumann, a German.

Even outside the trans-Atlantic alliance, the U.S. has generally supported European efforts to integrate defense programs. To be sure, it was ambivalent about the Franco-German move in 1992 to establish a unified military force, Eurocorps. American policymakers would have preferred that the new force operate under NATO command, but ultimately welcomed the heightened cooperation between continental Europe's leading powers. Indeed, the U.S. has been remarkably positive about other forms of military cooperation beyond American control, such as the Common Security and Defense Policy in the Maastricht Treaty and the European Defense Agency in the Lisbon Treaty – so positive, in fact, that some conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation have expressed concern about a diminution of NATO's authority. Luke Coffey (2013), the Margaret Thatcher Fellow at Heritage, noted with alarm that then-President Obama, attending his first NATO summit in 2009, praised Europe for developing "more robust defense capabilities" on its own.[23]

During his chaotic term as president (2017–2020), Donald Trump pursued an "America First" platform that upset relations with allies across the

Atlantic. He attacked the EU as a "vehicle for Germany," imposed tariffs on EU imports, applauded British citizens for voting to leave the regional organization, and appeared to encourage other member-states to follow suit. The U.S. president also blasted NATO as "obsolete," and demanded higher defense spending from European member-states. Although France, chastened by Trumpism, has called for greater autonomy from the U.S., other European states welcome the Biden administration's renewed commitment to multilateralism.

Indeed, between 1945 and today, the story of U.S.–Western European relations has been, with that recent exception, one of brokered multilateralism. American power prevailed, stipulating the parameters of "acceptable" foreign policy among allies in this period. But it did not overwhelm or coerce Europe. The U.S. was influential, even hegemonic; but it generally was not imperious in its relations with Europe. For the most part, it has promoted horizontal cooperation with, and within, the region.

Asia: American imperialism

Unlike the way they have dealt with European powers, American political elites have long treated Asia imperiously. They often have viewed themselves as the rightful rulers or at least as natural guardians of the region. And they repeatedly have undermined efforts at multilateralism, as evidenced by the failure of initiatives such as Malaysia's EAEG and Japan's AMF (outlined earlier in this chapter). "In East Asia," argues Beason (2005: 982), "American power has either made regionalism difficult because of the essentially bilateral strategic architecture it has created or – until recently at least – actively opposed regional initiatives that threaten to undercut its influence."

This imperious stance toward the region first emerged in the very late 19th century, when the U.S. began to gobble up territories in the Pacific: Hawaii, Wake, Midway, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippines. U.S. imperialists believed their nation had a clear, perhaps even divine mandate to expand across the Pacific, which they increasingly referred to as an "American Lake," or – in the ethnocentric discourse of MacArthur – an "Anglo-Saxon Lake."[24] U.S. domination, they argued, was necessary for Asian development, modernization, and liberation.

In the most dramatic case, U.S. soldiers teamed up with Filipino nationalists to end Spanish rule over the Philippines – but then chose to remain, succeeding the Spaniards as colonial overlords. The battle against nationalist guerrillas was brutal and bloody, extinguishing the lives of more than 4,000 Americans and at least 250,000 Filipinos. Karnow (1989: 191–192) notes that U.S. commanders, many of them veterans of Indian wars, directed their troops to "burn and kill the natives." After overwhelming the resistance, U.S. officials spent nearly a half-century ruling the Philippines. As noted earlier, they did not trust Filipinos to govern themselves.[25]

If U.S. behavior in the Philippines represented typically ruthless imperialism, others have suggested American elites adopted a kind of "sentimental

imperialism" in their relations with China. They tried (and sometimes failed) to defend that embattled nation from other predators, especially the Japanese.

At the conclusion of World War II, U.S. defense planners called for absolute domination of Asia. American security, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "rests on the ability … to control the Pacific Ocean and since no such control can be effective unless it is complete," any breaks in the system of military bases "tend greatly to weaken if not vitiate the effectiveness of the system as a whole."[26] Likewise, American diplomats sought exclusive and top-down relations with junior partners in the region.

The U.S. carried out its occupation of Japan in the name of the "Allied Powers," but did not in reality share power with them as it did in Germany. The occupation authority – SCAP (the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) – was a strictly American body led by General MacArthur. It ruled through the civilian bureaucracy, but tolerated little dissent. In addition to censoring literature, newspapers, magazines, and film, rejecting flattering narratives of the Japanese military and unflattering depictions of the U.S. military, SCAP wrote a new constitution for Japan after rejecting a proposal from Japanese politicians and legal scholars.

On the Korean peninsula, the U.S. had to contend with another occupying authority, the Soviet Union – at least until 1948, when Syngman Rhee, the U.S.-based expatriate favored by Americans, became the president of a new Republic of Korea in the south. In China, the U.S. aligned itself with Chiang's pro-capitalist regime from 1945 to 1949, and it continued to back the nationalists even after they lost the civil war on the mainland and retreated to Taiwan.

In sharp contrast to their alliance-building methods in Europe, American leaders forged essentially bilateral rather than multilateral pacts in Asia. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (AMPO to the Japanese), revised in 1960, was the central axis in the so-called "hub-and-spokes" pattern in Asia. But similar bilateral deals were arranged with the Philippines in 1951, South Korea in 1953, and the Republic of China/Taiwan in 1954. (The U.S. nullified this treaty in 1980 after it normalized relations with the People's Republic of China.) Although they supported greater economic exchange and political cooperation, Washington bureaucrats in 1957 decided that "the U.S. should not initiate efforts to form new regional economic organizations in Asia." Rather, it should pursue closer relations with individual countries through selective projects; in other words, through bilateral agreements.[27]

It is true that the U.S. brokered the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, but this was a geographically incoherent grouping that included only two Southeast Asian nations (the Philippines and Thailand) while encompassing European states (the U.K. and France). More importantly, it specifically reserved for the U.S. the ability to act unilaterally. This was spelled out in the 1962 Rusk–Thanat statement, in which the U.S. emphasized that its military duty to Thailand "does not depend upon prior agreement of

all the other parties to the treaty, since the obligation is individual as well as collective."

Likewise, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) note that SEATO's structure was markedly different from NATO's. There was, for example, no unified command, no multilateral allocation of defense resources. U.S. authorities even tried to avoid the widespread use of the SEATO acronym because they feared such usage would invite inappropriate comparisons to NATO. As the State Department (1954: 740) argued, the SEA pact "is not conceived [by the United States] as a parallel to NATO."

Even now, decades after the Cold War's end, the U.S. military seeks to dominate the region and contain a rising China with its overwhelming firepower. Pacific Command (PACOM), based in Hawaii, still oversees an extensive system of bases with about 90,000 soldiers and sailors from Yokosuka to Darwin, and with state-of-the-art defense technology. Admiral Harry Harris, PACOM commander, has boasted that "everything that's new and cool is coming to the region," including a new fleet of Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers.[28]

Organizationally, Washington-led bilateralism continues to undergird the regional architecture of East Asia. The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance, in particular, is "the basis for stability and prosperity in the region," according to Joseph Nye (2010), who helped write the Pentagon's 1995 East Asian Strategy Report. This means the U.S. is skeptical about new patterns of regionalism that do not privilege U.S. power.

In 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) toppled the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the new prime minister in Tokyo – Hatoyama Yukio – called for a dramatic reorientation of Japanese foreign policy: a strengthening of "fraternal" bonds with Japan's neighbors, including China, which seemed to imply less dependence on the country's longstanding military patron. Among other things, he proposed an "East Asia Community" modeled on the European Union. Japan's sudden policy shift rattled those in charge of "alliance maintenance" in Washington. They were especially upset by a DPJ proposal to reduce the size of the U.S. military footprint in Okinawa, which currently is dotted with 32 different American bases – 25% of the island's land mass. Defense Secretary Robert Gates quickly traveled to Tokyo to tell the Hatoyama administration in no uncertain terms that it could not abrogate an agreement to maintain the level of troops in Okinawa by relocating a controversial U.S. Marine Corps base to a different site on the island.

No one should be surprised by the outcome: the DPJ eventually buckled, reneging on its campaign promise to base-weary Okinawans and maintaining the previous LDP regime's commitment to the U.S. troop deployment policy.

Christopher Hughes (2004: 13) notes that fledgling multilateral arrangements, a "noodle bowl" of different forms of regionalism, have emerged in East Asia. These range from relatively weak bilateral and plurilateral trade

agreements to six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Like me, however, Hughes does not envision a major change in East Asia's status quo: "The U.S. makes it clear that it tolerates multilateral frameworks only so far as they supplement and do not supplant its existing hub-and-spokes system; if they challenge it, then it demonstrates no interest."

Conclusion

Alternative explanations

Europe is a region characterized by deep multilateralism in both the security and economic realms. East Asia, by contrast, is built on a system of bilateral military alliances (the "hub-and-spokes" pattern), dominated by the U.S., and an under-institutionalized trade and investment regime. Why? Scholars offer a variety of answers for this difference.

I think we can most easily reject arguments that emphasize the characteristics, policies, and preferences of different states. For example, Ikenberry (2004) and other liberals highlight the diversity of regime-type in postwar Asia. Unlike Western Europe, characterized by like-minded democratic states, this region was populated with both liberal and illiberal states – not natural partners. That was certainly true for a time – even as late as the mid-1980s. But soon thereafter a liberal Japan found itself surrounded by democratic or democratizing neighbors, including South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and eventually Indonesia. The U.S. could have encouraged these states to band together, or could have aligned with them horizontally as the Obama administration finally proposed to do with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it could have excluded an authoritarian regime like China, just as it excluded socialist states from the European order after World War II. But the U.S. stuck to its guns.

Some realists focus on Japanese foreign policy. Grieco (1996) suggests that Japan, unlike Germany, has chosen to tether itself tightly to the U.S. because it lives in a neighborhood that is dramatically more dangerous than Europe. Gould and Krasner (2003) argue that Japan, a rising economic power, has chosen to maintain its freedom of action by not enmeshing itself in an Asian trading regime that is as cohesive as the European Economic Community or EU. Coming from realists, these perspectives seem odd because they dismiss the overwhelming might of the world's most powerful state (the U.S.), which oversees Japanese security.

Other realists focus on American foreign policy. Victor Cha (2010) believes the U.S. feared entrapment by potentially feisty allies in East Asia, including the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea, and a still-reforming Japan. Under a multilateral security regime, these pro-capitalist states might have triggered war with communist rivals. Cha writes that the U.S. chose the "hub-and-spokes" pattern of bilateral ties because it could better control these "rogue allies" and avoid unnecessary conflict with communist powers in the region. This view fails the test of time: if it were true, one might expect the

U.S. to soften its opposition to multilateralism as the region's allies became more reliable and less bellicose. In fact, however, American opposition to such regionalism has remained solid in the post-Cold War environment.

Acharya (2009) offers a constructivist perspective, arguing that Asia's loose form of regionalism reflects the social norms adopted by Asian leaders themselves. Nationalist elites in Asia, he says, eschew European-style multilateralism because they fear it would undermine their newly acquired sovereignty. This might make sense for Southeast Asian states like Indonesia and Malaysia that only became independent after World War II, but not for Japan, a state that was never colonized and actually functioned as an imperialist power for half a century. Unless one acknowledges Tokyo's more recent dependence on U.S. military might, one cannot really understand its reluctance to push harder for multilateralism, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan was still the technology leader in Asia.

I am sympathetic to structural arguments. Neo-realists like Crone (1993) note that American leaders opted for this hegemonic pattern in pan-Pacific relations because they *could*. That is, U.S. power was, until quite recently, entirely unchallenged in Asia. Unlike European states, traditionally strong powers, Asian states have been relatively weak – either still emerging or, in the case of Japan, reemerging.[29] This approach rests on an undeniable truth that power matters, shaping the options of states and social actors. But the weakness of this approach is evident in the fact that, even today, when the region hosts a number of significant powers such as South Korea and Indonesia, in addition to the world's third largest economy (Japan), the U.S still strives to remain at the center of Asian regionalism.

Another structural argument highlights the different geo-political configurations of power in the two regions at the end of World War II: in Europe, Soviet troops with a clear superiority in conventional weapons were amassed just across the border from West Germany and appeared ready for expansion; in Asia, by contrast, they would have had to cross the ocean to conquer Japan, South Korea, and other U.S. allies. Bracken (1999: 26), for example, argues that, because the U.S. faced a less urgent threat in Asia, it could afford to rely on bilateral alliances there. But this claim ignores the fact that U.S. policy did not significantly change in response to the rising challenge posed by America's ideological rivals in Asia. China became a communist power in 1949 and displayed its resolve just a year later, when thousands of volunteers with the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yalu River to push U.S. troops out of North Korea. In addition, communist forces mobilized across Southeast Asia, securing power in Hanoi and Phnom Penh. But U.S. support for multilateralism in that region did not grow with the growing threat.

A more persuasive explanation: power plus identity

The U.S. has approached Europe and Asia in very different ways. It has treated the mother continent as an equal, or almost equal, player in the world, in part

because it did not enjoy a massive surfeit of power vis-à-vis European states, but also because it felt an affinity toward "Westerners." It trusted those states, and those citizens, to cooperate with the U.S., and with one another. By contrast, the U.S. looked down upon its Asian allies. Structurally, it was far more powerful, especially in the first three decades after World War II. But it also viewed Asians, culturally, as subordinates, as "little brown brothers" requiring adult supervision. This Janus-faced view of the two regions is rooted in power and identity – and largely unchanged over the past century and a half.

To solve our puzzle, we must draw on insights from two different schools of international relations (IR) theory. Realists point us to the disparate configurations of power and geopolitics in these two regions at the start of the Cold War. In Europe, the U.S. enjoyed the support of crippled but rebuilding powers of roughly equal size resisting an apparently looming threat of Soviet expansion. It pursued "empire by invitation" – for its own sake, of course, but also on behalf of insecure states like the U.K., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The situation in Asia was different. Except for Japan, which would redevelop quickly to become an unparalleled economic power, the region was – at least initially – characterized by weakness, not strength. The U.S. had long played an outsized role here, and it continued to dominate. In addition, capitalist allies in Asia faced a more diffuse set of communist threats – from other states, including the People's Republic of China, but also from communist insurgencies within their own borders.

In other words, the U.S. enjoyed unparalleled power in Asia, and thus chose to "rule" the region through a hub-and-spokes pattern. Indeed, one cannot understand this initial choice of bilateralism over multilateralism without accounting for gross asymmetries in power. But this explanation, as previously noted, fails to explain the remarkable continuity in U.S. policy in Asia despite changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Washington leaned hard on Japan, even after it became the world's number two economy, to refrain from joining the East Asian Economic Group. And it subsequently pushed Japan to abandon its proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund to bail out the region's distressed economies. Most recently, American leaders pushed for a trade liberalization scheme, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that would have excluded Asia's largest economy (China), favoring it over a variety of regional initiatives centered on Southeast Asia's established grouping (ASEAN) plus the three Northeast Asian powers (China, Japan, and South Korea).[30]

We can only understand the continuity in U.S. backing for a hub-and-spokes pattern of alliances in Asia by adopting an approach that highlights identity as well as power. U.S. officials pursued this series of bilateral ties in Asia because they *could*, but also because they did not trust their allies in Asia to act "appropriately" on their own. Although they felt a special connection, maybe even a "kinship," with their European partners, they did not identify as equals or even associates with Asian states.

"America First," the slogan repeated by then-President Trump, seemed to represent a break from the post–World War II foreign policy of the U.S. And

for a while, it did appear to jeopardize multilateralism in Europe. But as the November 2020 election approached, the president increasingly focused his nationalist outrage on China, which came to occupy the role of #1 foreign adversary. Trump ended trade talks with Beijing, blamed it for the global COVID-19 pandemic, and sanctioned it for mistreatment of Muslims in Xinjiang and student protesters in Hong Kong. He closed a Chinese diplomatic compound in Houston, and sent his national security adviser to Europe to drum up support for his campaign to block Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei's access to 5-G networks. And then Trump was defeated in his bid for reelection by a foreign policy traditionalist. President Biden is likely to rebuild a "Western" alliance.

In his seminal book on IR theory, Vitalis (2015) encourages us not to ignore the role of racism and colonialism in global politics. Bhambra (2020) goes further, suggesting that one cannot understand the contemporary interstate system without addressing its racialized systems of hierarchy. I have tried to follow this advice in explaining the Janus-viewed of regionalism adopted by the U.S. In addition to power, racial identity has informed the very different American attitudes and policies toward European and Asian regionalism.

Notes

1 The U.S. hegemonic vision probably generates greater consent in Europe than in Asia, where China's model of capitalism allows a bigger role for the state. But even China is eager to participate in U.S.-led institutions like the WTO and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2 The IMF accords voting rights to states based on their financial contributions to the intergovernmental organization over time. The U.S. has about 17% of IMF voting rights – far more than any other state. (Germany and Japan each have about 6%.) Given that a "significant" decision by the Board of Governors requires an 85% supermajority, the U.S. is the only state with veto power in the IMF.
3 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles coined the term "hub-and-spokes" to describe the pattern of American-led bilateral alliances with subordinate Asian allies.
4 There are many examples of hybrid analysis using constructivism and realism. See for example Spiro (1999).
5 "Humanities" or "Western Civilization" courses tend to start with the Greeks (Socrates and Sophocles), move through Italy (Dante), Germany (Goethe), France (Voltaire), and Great Britain (Chaucer and Shakespeare), and end up in the U.S. with Longfellow or perhaps Twain. This has been, for years, the only required course all students at Reed College must take. Under pressure from critical students and faculty, the College added a section on Gilgamesh.
6 Robert Vitalis (2015) reminds us that *Foreign Affairs*, which published Buell's piece and remains the preeminent U.S. policy publication on international relations, was originally called *The Journal of Race Development*.
7 See Bernal (1994: 126).
8 See U.S. Senate (1949), "North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations," 81st Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C., S. 206.

9 Of course, this "community" did not always exist. It was, like most things, socially constructed in the hothouse of interstate conflict. Before World War II, Henrikson (1975) notes, world maps drawn in the U.S. tended to show the cartographer's home country in the center, surrounded by two oceans. But in the early 1940s, as the U.S. first shipped supplies and then troops into besieged Europe, those maps began to take on a new form, with the Atlantic Ocean in the middle of a world apparently pivoting around the U.S. on "the west" and Europe on "the east."
10 U.S. Senate (1949: 380).
11 From his radio address to the nation, September 10, 1988 (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, p. 1152).
12 Miller (1982: 134).
13 See Karnow (1989: 167–195).
14 See U.S. Senate, "Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations," *Military Situation in the Far East*, May 1951, part 1, especially p. 312. To be fair, I should note that some Americans, including John Foster Dulles, feared the strategic consequences of such racialized arrogance. At the same time, I will add that the Cold Warrior's view was an instrumentalist one that might not have reflected his actual feelings. He was concerned that Western attitudes might yield an anti-white, pro-communist backlash. See Koshiro (1999: 44).
15 MacArthur, of course, also had grossly underestimated Japanese military capabilities at the very start of World War II. Dower (1986: 105) notes that the general was stunned when, nine days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese warplanes wiped out his air force in the Philippines. He "refused to believe that the pilots could have been Japanese"; instead, he "insisted they must have been white mercenaries." But MacArthur was in good company. Dower (1986: 102–3) quotes other U.S. military analysts, including Fletcher Pratt, who – before Pearl Harbor – embraced rather complex racial theories about why the Japanese could not effectively wage war.
16 The friend who quoted Acheson was Walt Whitman Rostow, the development economist who worked closely with the U.S. State Department. See Isaacson and Thomas (1986: 698).
17 James Dao, "The World: Why Keep U.S. Troops?" in *New York Times*, January 5, 2003.
18 Kevin Maher apparently made the remarks in a briefing to a group of American University students. Shortly after a report surfaced, Maher and the State Department complained that the remarks were made "off the record," but did not deny them. Much later, after he was dismissed, Maher gave an interview in which he called the report of his comments a "fabrication." But a professor who attended the briefing backed up his AU students. See David Vine, "Smearing Japan," at http://fpif.org/smearing_japan/.
19 See, for example, Sloan (2005).
20 The exception came in early 2003, when the leaders of France and Germany came out firmly in opposition to President George W. Bush's planned invasion of Iraq. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the two powers represented "Old Europe." Bush's successor, Barack Obama, managed to restore close relations with European allies; he was, on Trans-Atlantic policy, a proponent of old-fashioned multilateralism. Obama's successor, Donald Trump, engaged in unilateralist ("America First") discourse, but ultimately was unable to destroy the institutional

ecology in Europe. Most importantly, he was replaced in 2021 by Joe Biden, another die-hard multilateralist.

21 See U.S. State Department (Acting Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs) 1949, p. 121.

22 Italy also joined NATO that year.

23 See White House press release, "Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall," April 3, 2009. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-strasbourg-town-hall.

24 Whitelaw Reid, a member of the Peace Commission for the Philippines, may have been the first to describe the Pacific as an "American Lake" – in 1898. See McCormick (1967: 119). Within years, the term was de rigueur among expansionists (Beale 1962). MacArthur recast and racialized the concept in a 1949 speech (see Whiting 1968: 39).

25 The U.S. viewed Japan at this time as a fellow imperialist. In 1905, through the Taft–Katsura memorandum, it informally acknowledged Japanese control over the Korean peninsula in exchange for Japan's recognition of U.S. control over the Philippines.

26 JCS Memorandum for Truman (September 9, 1947), FRUS 1947, Vol. 1, pp. 766–767, as quoted in Schaller (1985: 56–57).

27 Report of the Committee on Asian Regional Economic Development and Cooperation (chaired by Kenneth T. Young), U.S. Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Office of the Chairman, Special Studies Series, box 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene KS, p. 1. Quoted in Hoshiro (2009: 402).

28 Quoted in *The Economist*, April 22, 2017, p. 6.

29 Duffield (2001: 75–82) offers a variant of this structural realist argument, suggesting that the U.S. chose a hub-and-spokes approach not because it *could*, but because it *had to*. There was only one re-emerging Great Power in Asia (Japan), militating against the horizontal alliance pursued by American leaders in Europe.

30 In the early days of the Trump regime, the U.S. withdrew from TPP, leaving the 11 remaining member-states to carry on without the leader.

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