


John Roderick's

What You Should Know About

The People's Republic of



CHINA



AN ASSOCIATED PRESS CLOSE-TO-THE-NEWS BOOK

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PUBLICATION

**WHAT
YOU
SHOULD
KNOW
ABOUT**

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
 **CHINA**

by AP Correspondent
JOHN RODERICK
and the staff writers and photographers of
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

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JOHN RODERICK

JOHN RODERICK of *The Associated Press*, who penetrated the Bamboo Curtain with the U.S. table tennis team in 1971, is a 26-year veteran of AP's foreign service and has been assigned to the Tokyo bureau since 1959. An expert on China and Far Eastern affairs, he was one of the first American newsmen to report on the Communist situation in China just after World War II. He covered wide areas of China for three years after the war, interviewing Mao Tse-tung in the Communists' remote cave capital in Yen-an and later helped cover the war in Indochina and the growth of the state of South Vietnam. He is The AP's No. 1 "China-watcher."

'The Announcement... Is Being Issued Simultaneously in Peking and the United States'

The President of the United States faced full into the television cameras and said, with an evenness of voice which must have belied the inner excitement he felt, "The announcement I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Peking and the United States."

It was 6:30 p.m. July 15, 1971, a hot night in Burbank, Calif., where President Richard M. Nixon had hastily arranged for a studio from which to make a dramatic and unscheduled appearance before the nation.

In Peking, capital of the People's Republic of China, it was 10:30 a.m., and because of the international time difference, July 16. Glancing at his wrist watch, an editor of the official Hsinhua (New China) News Agency gave a signal to a teletype operator who threaded a perforated tape into his transmission machine. As Nixon spoke in distant California, it chattered the message which was to startle, intrigue and astonish the world, Communist and non-Communist alike.

"Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to July 11, 1971."

"Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972."

"President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure."

"The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

Nixon described his mission to Peking, later scheduled for Feb. 21-28, 1972, as "a journey for peace... peace not just for our generation but for future generations on this earth we share together."

'Ping-Pong Diplomacy'

Then he used a phrase familiar for more than 70 years in the language of Sino-American diplomacy. It was "the open door." He had, he said, undertaken initia-

tives in the past three years "to open the door for more normal relations between our two countries."


Three months earlier, a U.S. table tennis team and three American correspondents had crossed into China on the first visit of ordinary Americans to the mainland since 1949. At that time a pleased Nixon had said in reply to questions that he and members of his family would be delighted to go to China, someday. It was the kind of pleasantry one might expect from a chief of state whose country had made a 180-degree turn in its long-hostile relations with another.

No one suspected, however, that this Republican president, who had built his early reputation on the vigor with which he sought out Communists in government, would break the tight official logjam which had characterized Sino-American relations for 22 years.

Americans in general, and many nations, welcomed Nixon's bold initiative and the Chinese response to it. They saw it as holding out a bright promise for peace in the long-troubled Pacific. They applauded the likelihood that the People's Republic of China, a nation of 750 million people, would now take an active part in international affairs.

There was no such enthusiasm on the island of Taiwan, off the Chinese coast, where Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek presided over the exiled Republic of China.


Defeated by the Communists in China's bitter civil war, Chiang fled to Taiwan (also known as Formosa) in 1949. How long he might have survived after that if the North Korean Communists had not attacked the Republic of South Korea the following year is one of the tantalizing and unanswered questions of history. That act prompted the United States to abandon an already-stated policy of "do-nothingness" as far as the fate of Taiwan was concerned. For the next two decades, Chiang benefited from American military and economic aid. U.S. policy towards Peking dropped into the deep freeze. In the United Nations, successive American administrations led the fight to block the People's Republic from occupying the seat marked "China."



President Richard M. Nixon



Chairman Mao Tse-tung



Premier Chou En-lai

Though Nixon was careful to say in his summit announcement that the new relationship with Peking would not be "at the expense of our old friends," both he and Chiang were aware that the shape of things in Asia would never be the same again.

New U.N.-China Policy

Shortly before debate began on the annual question of China representation in the United Nations, Nixon announced a new policy: he would support Peking's entry while seeking to maintain Taiwan in the General Assembly. On Oct. 25, 1971, however, the Assembly, by a decisive vote, ousted Chiang's government and seated the People's Republic. Henry Kissinger's presence in Peking on his second round of preliminary talks with Chou could not have failed to influence the outcome.

To understand the enormous significance of the Nixon-Chou summit, it was only necessary to remember that there were young men and women in China who had grown up fearing and mistrusting the United States as the main threat to Chinese existence. Similarly, a generation of Americans regarded China as arrogant, bellicose and a menace to the American way of life.

The Chinese felt confirmed in their antagonism by a deliberate American policy to contain and isolate them from the other nations of Asia. The neutralization of Taiwan, depriving them of the last and richest prize of their triumph, rankled. And so did the continuing campaign against them in the United Nations.

They remembered also that the United States had taken sides in the earlier civil war by extending aid and advice to Chiang Kai-shek.

The Americans had their grievances. One of these was the Chinese involvement in Korea. The 40,000 American dead from that war hung like an albatross around the necks of future American policy-makers, complicating and embittering the process of Sino-American relations.

Another millstone was Vietnam. In the 1960s, Americans had once more disembarked on an Asian battlefield to shore up a pro-American government endangered by Communist aggression. This time, the Chinese committed no fighting men to the struggle but, by military

and economic aid—backed by virulent anti-American propaganda—encouraged the Vietnamese Communists to fight to the finish. Many Americans believed—rightly or wrongly—that the Chinese sought the defeat of South Vietnam in order to knock over the remaining countries of Southeast Asia in domino fashion.

The Chinese pictured the American presence in Vietnam as a resurgence of the imperialism which had long shadowed China's modern-day existence. They feared that once North Vietnam fell, China would be next.

The 'Missionary' Influence

In looking at China, Americans found it difficult to be coldly objective. Generations of American missionaries had borne the Christian torch into that poverty-stricken country. They had not confined themselves to preaching the gospel. They had cared for the stricken in mission-supported hospitals, taught the illiterate in mission schools and distributed food in time of famine. Returning to their homeland to raise money for these charitable causes, they had spread the story of China into the remotest parts of America.

The missionary influence on American policy towards China was immense. Thanks to it, successive presidents found it difficult to avoid adopting a moral attitude towards the Chinese. This gave rise to what has since been called "ethical diplomacy," foreign policy which not only satisfied American self-interest but conformed to the moral standards Americans applied to themselves. In recognizing the new Chinese Republic of 1912, President Woodrow Wilson went a step further and observed that since American interests were largely missionary ones, the first diplomatic representative should be an evangelical Christian. The idea persisted. The last U.S. ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, was such a man.

The magnitude of the campaign to convert, help and educate the Chinese bred in Americans an attitude of possessiveness towards China not felt towards any other country. When Chiang Kai-shek, at the insistence of his beautiful American-educated wife, became a Christian convert, the identification was complete.

During China's civil conflict, there was no question where American sympathies lay. Chiang and his Kuomin-

tang party appeared to many Americans to be defending Christianity and democracy; the Communists represented an anti-religious, anti-democratic movement supported by the Soviet Union. After coming to power, the Communists did nothing to allay these doubts. Instead, they discouraged religious activity, arrested, imprisoned or expelled many missionaries and native priests and put others to death. They turned their backs on the United States and chose to put their eggs in the Soviet basket.

The years which followed inauguration of the People's Republic failed to dispel the deeply grounded antipathy felt by many Americans. The seizure of Tibet, an attempt to take the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and an invasion of India combined with the Korean offensive to give the new China a reputation for bellicosity and aggressiveness.

The image the Communists projected domestically seemed hardly less paranoiac. Under the leadership of Communist Chairman Mao Tse-tung, purge succeeded purge. Millions of Chinese whose only crime seemed to be that they owned property were imprisoned or killed. Finally, in the 1960s, the Maoist regime broke with the Russians, exploded the first of a series of nuclear devices and convulsed the country in a three-year purge called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Thousands of Communists, some of them described as eager for better relations with the West, were arrested or dismissed from office, millions of others were subjected to the tortures of the young Red Guards, embassies were sacked or burned and foreigners abused.

Seen against this background, the invitation to tour China extended at Nagoya, Japan, to the U.S. table tennis

team was more than a friendly gesture among sportsmen. It represented a sudden and dramatic reversal of the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic.


Relations Eased Earlier

Though it astonished the world as much as the Peking summit announcement would later, there had been earlier signs that the two nations wished to draw closer together. The Cultural Revolution had ended in the spring of 1969 and, soon after, Nixon laid down at Guam his belief that Americans should no longer be dispatched to fight Asian wars. On the heels of a presidential visit to the Pacific, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced the lifting of restrictions on American trade with, and travel to, China. Then, making an unprecedented visit to Hong Kong, he invited the Chinese to respond to these overtures.

The correspondents accompanying the table tennis team [John Roderick among them] reported that it was received with smiles, handshakes and a general mood of friendliness.

For four days the Chinese maintained official silence on the meaning of their invitation to the table tennis players and the correspondents. Then on April 14, Premier Chou En-lai, the architect of the new moderate Chinese foreign policy, told them, "A new page has been turned in relations between the United States and China."

Turning to me, he used the old phrase so familiar to Americans and Chinese. "Mr. Roderick," he said, "you opened the door."



AP Correspondent John Roderick in Peking, April 1971. Background is mural of Mao Tse-tung.

Open Doors and Yellow Perils

The Open Door was the phrase used to describe U.S. policy toward China from 1900 to 1949. Simply stated, it called on the Big Powers which had carved China into "spheres of interest" to respect Chinese territorial integrity and give American traders equal opportunities of exploitation.

First enunciated by Secretary of State John Hay, it satisfied the missionaries and the treaty port businessmen. But because no administration felt strong enough domestically to invoke force it remained a pious platitude until 1941. In the summer of that year, Franklin D. Roosevelt applied sanctions against Japan in an attempt to halt its further despoilation of China. Pearl Harbor was the result.

For nearly 3,000 years, China had been a bright spot on the mottled shield of human civilization. It gave the world exquisite paintings, superb porcelains, graceful statues and profound systems of thought. Its power matched its cultural greatness. Over the centuries "barbarians" from other countries came on hands and knees to pay tribute to the Middle Kingdom and its resplendent emperors.

But in the 18th century, a new kind of "barbarian" descended on Chinese shores. He came from Europe and the United States and demanded the right to trade. The emperor haughtily told them to go home and return when they were prepared to make the requisite "kowtows" of subservience. Instead of going, they hauled out their big guns and took aim. The emperor, a respecter of unadorned power, relented.

The advent of the Industrial Revolution sharpened the appetites and heightened the demands of the Westerners. The steam-driven machines which had replaced the old handcrafters were hungry for raw materials; the finished products they produced in such quantity opened up the need for more and bigger markets. Raw materials and potential markets existed in the backward nations of the earth. It soon became apparent that most of these nations were so weak they could be persuaded by bribery, threats or force to give up their resources at prices few could afford to ignore. Invoked hesitantly at first, the process acquired virtue through repetition. Later it gained the mantle of respectability by being accepted as govern-

ment policy. Called "imperialism," it evoked in the breasts of the ruling classes of the industrialized states visions of pomp and circumstance, and the comforting feeling which comes from civilizing "lesser" breeds of men.

The imperialists who penetrated China were indignant at the arrogance and superior airs assumed by the emperor. The Son of Heaven insisted on treating them with condescension and contempt. In his eyes they were large, meaty and repulsive. The phrase for them was "ta pi tze" (big noses) or "hung kwei-tze" (red devils). The emperor was ill-advised. Insolence in a weak ruler invites disaster.

The Opium Wars

The British were the first to teach the occupant of the Dragon Throne to mind his manners. In two wars, called the Opium Wars, they forced him to acquiesce to their use of opium in the China trade. In the process they acquired the island of Hong Kong, adjacent Kowloon and the commissionership of customs which gave them control of trade. The Russians obtained chunks of Siberia while the Americans were appeased with promises of equal trade opportunities.

These wars weakened an already feeble monarchy. It nearly collapsed in the Taiping Rebellion of 1851-64, an uprising of peasants led by a native Christian who fancied himself god. Sensing disaster if the radical peasants won, the Big Powers helped the Imperial forces to defeat them.

Until 1867, the Manchus who sat on the tottering throne disdained to name a foreign minister; foreigners came under the department dealing with Outer Barbarians. Ironically, in the light of so many later events, it was an American who first represented Chinese interests abroad. Anson Burlingame, a former U.S. congressman from Massachusetts, was named by Abraham Lincoln to be minister to China. He served in that post with distinction. Through his charm and urbanity of manner he became the unofficial leader of the diplomatic corps. When he retired in 1867, the emperor made him its foreign minister. In 1868, he made a triumphal journey across the United States. Everywhere he spoke he drew admiring

thongs. It was he who won from Washington the commitment to Chinese territorial integrity which was to appear in the policy of John Hay. He also got an agreement on reciprocal immigration, opening the gates to an influx of Chinese laborers who built America's first transcontinental railway, only to become the objects of later racist discrimination.

He got the British to acknowledge that China should be treated with somewhat more tolerance, then he died in St. Petersburg, Russia, of pneumonia. He had done much to present China's case to the world.

The Japanese had come late on the imperialist scene. Pried open from 250 years of oyster-like isolation by the black ships of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry, they avoided China's fate by quickly acquiring the skills and weapons of the West. By 1894 they were demanding their share of the China spoils. Disputing Chinese suzerainty over Korea, they defeated China in 1895, acquired Formosa (Taiwan), the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria, and the "independence" of Korea.

These acquisitions were sufficient to keep statesmen and military planners profitably occupied for many years on designs to get them back. It would take two world wars for them to succeed.

'The Yellow Peril'

The German kaiser had a more immediate—and recurring—nightmare. He feared that the Chinese and

Japanese might one day join hands to oust all Europeans from Asia. He called this "the Yellow Peril." Japanese proximity to China in Manchuria seemed to him the possible beginning of such an alliance. Joining with Russia and France, he persuaded Japan to disgorge the Liaotung Peninsula. As solace, he got a battered China to pay the Japanese a large indemnity. Japan never forgot the humiliation. It had only to wait a few years for revenge.

The Big Powers now settled down to slicing up the prostrate body of China into "spheres of interest" where they exercised economic control; in the event of the breakup of China, they had provided that they could annex the areas outright.

Outraged by these new indignities, a strange and motley collection of peasants rose against the foreigners. Called "the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists," they wore amulets which made them proof against injury. Encouraged by the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, a small, determined and coldly cruel woman who hated the "barbarians," they besieged the foreign legations in 1900 with the cry: "Protect the country, destroy the foreigner."

They killed the German ambassador and bottled up the diplomats, their families, and an assortment of missionaries for 55 days before a joint international expedition lifted the siege. When the rebellion had been put down, Hay addressed notes to the Big Powers which spelled out the Open Door principles. Most of them accepted the idea, then neglected it.




The Taiping Rebellion of 1851-64 nearly wrecked the reigning Tartar dynasty. It was an uprising of peasants led by a native Christian who fancied himself god.

The Rise of Nationalism

At the beginning of a new century, China was a helpless giant bleeding from a hundred cuts. The British held areas in the Yangtze River area, the French a zone in South China, the Germans part of the Shantung Peninsula and the Russians the peninsula of Manchuria from which they had so lately dislodged the Japanese. In 1900, in the confusion of the Boxer Rebellion, the Russians moved into South Manchuria. This was too much for the Japanese who, after prudently negotiating an alliance with Britain which insured its neutrality, attacked the Russians at Port Arthur without the formality of a declaration of war. Steaming halfway around the world, the Russian Baltic fleet went down under the hammering of Japanese naval guns in the Tsushima Strait. Japan surged back into Manchuria.

These myriad blows finally toppled the Manchus into the dust. In 1911, riots which began with the stockholders of a railroad unhappy over the inadequacy of a government loan, spread like a prairie fire. On Feb. 12, 1912, the boy emperor, Pu Yi, abdicated and the radical revolutionaries of Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang party proclaimed the Republic.

Brilliant, shrewd, but also vain and personally ambitious, the Imperial commander, Yuan Shih-kai, exercised great power despite the Republican victory. Hoping to unify the country, Sun made him president. He responded by attempting to become emperor. In 1916, bowing to public pressure and Big Power disapproval, he gave up



Sun Yat-sen

his dream of imperial glory; four months later he died. Though the crisis had passed, China remained divided, with a government in Peking supported by the Big Powers, and another in Canton headed by Sun.

World War I multiplied China's troubles. Japan seized the German holdings in Shantung and refused to give them up at the Peace Conference in Versailles. On May 4, 1919, Chinese of all classes demonstrated violently against the decision of the conference to let Japan keep Shantung.

The May 4th Movement

The dry tinder of nationalism needed only this match to set it ablaze. The May 4th Movement, as it was called, did not take the form of general anti-foreignism, despite the provocations China had endured over so many years. Instead, Sun channeled the powerful new energies suddenly released into a campaign to achieve national unity.

The warlords, or "tuchuns," stood in the way of this unity. The leaders of rag-tag bobtail private armies which gave them power of life and death over whole provinces, they were a strange lot. Some were illiterate, brutal and self-indulgent. Others were shrewd and intelligent.

Sun proposed to form an army and march against the warlords. He appealed to the Big Powers for help. They turned their backs. It was a fateful decision, for now the newly-established Soviet Union and its Marxist leaders stepped forward. They touched off a wave of enthusiasm by giving up extraterritoriality, the right to try Soviet nationals for crimes committed in China. When the first Soviet ambassador, Adolph Joffe, arrived in Peking, he was received by the Chinese in triumph. The diplomatic corps snubbed him.

In 1921, two leading professors at Peking University, Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu, joined with 10 other Marxists to form the Communist party of China. One of the 10 was a young assistant librarian at the university, Mao Tse-tung.

The year before, the Communist International (Comintern) had decided that Communist parties in colonial or semi-colonial countries should collaborate with nationalist movements.

In 1923, Moscow sent a young man named Mihail

In 1927, Mao studied the peasants in Hunan Province. "Within a short time," he concluded, "hundreds of millions of peasants will rise . . . with the fury of a hurricane; no power, however strong, can restrain them."

Borodin (his real name was Mikhail Grusenberg and he had once been a school principal in Chicago) to Canton to set up a military academy, oversee the delivery of Soviet arms and carry out the Comintern's decision. Sun at first demurred at working with the Communists but finally agreed to accept them as individuals. In 1925, in the midst of the preparations for the march north, Sun died. A doctor-turned-revolutionary, his ideas often were fuzzy and contradictory. He lacked boldness and resolve. But he laid down Three Principles of the People—nationalism, democracy and the people's livelihood—which long survived him. They are invoked in today's China.


Chiang Leads China

The man who succeeded Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, was a 38-year-old military officer who had been appointed president of the new Whampoa Military Academy. As a youth he spent two years in the Japanese army and admired its strong sense of discipline. The son of moderately well-to-do parents, his instincts were conservative, young Chinese patriots in Tokyo converted him to nationalism. He helped overthrow the Imperial system, unsuccessfully opposed Yuan Shih-kai and fled again to Japan. He returned to give Yuan the final push which ended his career. Made jobless by success, Chiang gravitated to Shanghai where he became a member of the Green Society, widely reputed active in shady financial speculations. In 1918, he hitched his wagon to Sun and began a career which brought him fame, position and bitterness.

Under the influence of the Soviet advisers, he read Marx and Lenin, adopting the latter's thesis that the root of China's decay lay in imperialism. He spent four months in the Soviet Union to learn the methods of the Red Army. In his spare, wiry person, all the currents of 20th century China met: Leninism, Christianity and Confucianism.

The strongest strain was Confucian; despite the other foreign influences he remained rigidly Chinese. A taciturn man, he kept his thoughts to himself. Erect and soldierly, he wore his hair short and seldom smiled. His eyes revealed nothing.

Though he was not a thinker, he had one trait which proved invaluable. He knew how to play one person off against another. And he was accustomed to command.



He rightly suspected that the Communists were biding their time until they could make their own bid for power. He tried, without success, to clip their wings. In mid-1926 the combined Nationalist-Communist forces made their long-awaited move. One objective after another fell before the well-trained revolutionaries. In Shanghai, a young Communist named Chou En-lai organized the workers and led them in the seizure of the police stations, the arsenal and the military headquarters. The warlord governor fled and the army walked in without a fight.

But the industrialists, bankers and landlords of Shanghai feared the radical wing of the Kuomintang, which included the Communists. In exchange for financial backing to complete the expedition, Chiang promised to purge them from the party. On April 12, 1927, he turned on his Communist allies in a savage bloodbath which left thousands dead or wounded. The Communist party went underground. Some elements quit Shanghai for Kiangsi Province. Mao was among them.

China Republic Born

Now rid of the radicals, Chiang's troops resumed the northward progress, allied with some of the "good," that is, pro-Nationalist, warlords and captured Peiping. In 1928 he established the Republic of China in Nanking.

The China of 1928 was far from the unified whole Chiang had dreamed of creating. He had to share power with the warlords who had helped him in the Northern Expedition and additionally was forced to cope with actions within the Kuomintang.

In the end, the factions would prove more difficult to handle than the warlords.

The Big Powers continued to act like states within a state, retaining powers of trade and commerce which no independent country would have tolerated. Extraterritoriality remained in effect; it was not abolished by the United States until Jan. 11, 1943, when the British also simultaneously did so.

China was, as it is today, the world's most populous nation, with an estimated 400 million people. It also was the poorest. The big cities teemed with the hungry, the overworked and the ill. For back-breaking work on the



Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, photo taken in Shanghai in 1928.

wharves, or pulling the more fortunate around town in rickshas, coolies earned a few coppers a day. Often barefoot in the chill cold of winter, they slept in their rickshas or in building doorways, kept barely alive on a few bowls of rice a day. Passersby in the early morning often saw in Shanghai what they believed to be bundles of rags; they were the poor and the ill who had died the night before. A patrol made periodic rounds each day to pick them up.

All this contrasted to the life style of the foreigner and the Chinese grown rich in his service. They lived in airy homes made handsome by rare art objects and livable by the toil of a dozen servants. The dollar and the pound sterling insured graceful living for very little; it was possible to maintain a riding stable, to entertain and to travel on \$25 a month. The servants' pay came out of this. The food was the best anywhere and of staggering variety. There were cooks said never to repeat a dish in 365 days of culinary zeal.

Life in the country, where the majority of Chinese lived, was, if anything, worse than in the big cities. The



peasant worked his fields from sunup to sundown, often knee deep in the mud of rice paddies. His existence depended on the vagaries of the weather. Typhoon, flood, drought and plagues of locusts ravished the land. What nature did not do, man finished. The tax collector took most of his produce and warlord soldiers often seized the rest. Famine periodically reduced the population by millions. All the peasant wanted was a small plot of land he could call his own; rich landlords, to whom he became deeply indebted, deprived him of even that solace. He became an agricultural laborer, his life mortgaged years in advance. It was small wonder that girl children were abandoned; they were inferior to boys as workers.

Workers' Revolution

Never was a country so ready for revolution. The Communists, contemplating the situation after their split with the Kuomintang, decided that the city workers were the most reliable vanguard of the revolt they hoped would boost them to power. This was classic Marxist-

Leninist doctrine, based partly on the Bolshevik Revolution. It was the avenue urged by Joseph Stalin in Moscow. The young Chinese comrades, led by Chou En-lai, agreed. For the next few years the "Stalinists" staged one unsuccessful uprising after another in the cities of Canton, Hankow, Nanchang and Changsha. Some of them were carried out in cooperation with the left wing of the Kuomintang, which included Madame Sun Yat-sen and Wang Ching-wei, the latter to gain dubious future fame as puppet president of Japanese-occupied China. Finally, even the left wing abandoned the Communists and the storm-the-cities plan had to be shelved.

It failed because the Chinese proletariat was tiny and badly organized. "Yellow" trade unions without a taste for revolution had been formed following Chiang's bloodbath in Shanghai. They wanted to be left alone. Stalin was a long way from China and didn't understand the situation.

Mao Tse-tung did not share the enthusiasm of the young Communists and Stalin for the proletariat as van-

guard of the Chinese revolution. In 1927 he had gone to his native Hunan Province where he undertook a study of the peasant.

"Within a short time," he wrote in his report, "hundreds of millions of peasants will rise in Central, South and North China, with the fury of a hurricane; no power, however strong, can restrain them. They will break all the shackles that bind them and rush toward the road of liberation. All imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants. All revolutionary parties will be judged by them. Are we to get in front of them and lead them or criticize them behind their backs or fight them from the opposite camp?"

While in Hunan, he had attempted unsuccessfully to lead the peasants in revolt. He defended the resort to violence and the bloodshed which followed.

Mao's Thoughts

"Revolution," he said, "is not a dinner party, nor a literary composition, nor painting, nor embroidery. It cannot be done so delicately, so leisurely, so gentlemanly and [here he quoted Confucius] so 'gently, kindly, politely, plainly and modestly.' Revolution is insurrection, the violent action of one class overthrowing the power of another. An agrarian revolution is a revolution by the peasantry to overthrow the power of the feudal landlord class. If the peasants do not apply great force, the power of the landlords, consolidated over thousands of years, can never be uprooted."

The young Stalinists in the party read the report but did not alter their strategy. Mao, knowing he was in the minority, did not insist.

There was a gulf between Mao and the majority which could not then be bridged. The handsome Chou and the Stalinists had gone to Moscow and had gotten their doctrine from the horse's mouth; Mao had never been abroad.

Chou, like the others, had come from a comfortable background. He was the descendant of Mandarins; his father was well educated and his mother inclined to literature. The May 4th demonstrations made him a nationalist. For his part in them he spent six months in a Tientsin jail,

satisfying the almost universal requirement that Asian prime ministers must have spent some time in prison. One of his prisonmates was a school girl named Teng Yingchao, later to become his wife. After prison, he went off to France to study and there in 1921 formed a branch of the Communist party. He traveled to Belgium and Germany, then returned to China where he served under Chiang Kai-shek as head of Whampoa's political depart-



Chou En-lai of China's Eighth Route Army.

ment. He had had no experience with workers before organizing the Shanghai uprising. It helped persuade him of their reliability. This was fortified a year later when he went to Moscow, captivated Stalin and was designated to carry out the proletariat-first policy.

Mao's Early Life

The son of a Hunan peasant, Mao was a rebellious child and a revolutionary youth. His parents were unschooled; his mother was illiterate. He ran away from home at the age of 10 and noted with satisfaction that defiance paid; his intemperate father and a cruel school teacher modified their attitudes.

He pored over books, particularly the classic stories of peasant rebellion. When the Manchus were overthrown, he cut off his pigtail as a sign of solidarity with the revolutionaries. He immersed himself in the translated works of Washington, Jefferson, Napoleon, Wellington, Catherine the Great, Voltaire and Rousseau.

A real peasant rebellion in Hunan shocked him into an awareness of the present; the peasant leaders were executed and their heads fixed to poles. The event, he said later, influenced the course of his life.

He formed a political study group at Changsha Normal School called Hsin Min Hsueh Hui (New People's Study Society) which dissected capitalist democracy, particularly that of Japan; Marxism was almost unknown at the time. In his free time he toughened his body and studied physical culture.

He taught school for two years and ever afterward regarded himself as a teacher. He was a believer in experience. To discover how the common soldier lived, he enlisted in the army for six months. From this he concluded that China could never gain independence without its own modern citizen army.

Before becoming a Communist, he had flirted with liberalism, constitutional monarchy and utopian socialism. He was 28 when he joined in forming the party and in his mid-thirties when he disagreed with Chou and the Stalinists; the youngest of them was only 23. They had little patience for the ideas of what they considered the aged.

After the Shanghai debacle, the core of the party

remained in Shanghai, moving about from place to place to avoid Chiang's secret police. Mao went to Changsha, the capital of Hunan, to organize a peasant revolt later called the Autumn Crop Uprising. From it he formed the first units of an army made up solely of peasants and workers. It fought its way to the Chinggangshan, a mountain on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, once a bandit stronghold. On Aug. 12, 1927, the 20th Army under Ho Lung, Yeh Ting and Chu Teh staged an uprising in Nanchang. Its remnants under Chu joined Mao's small forces on the mountain the next spring and the Red Army came into being.

The Autumn Crop Uprising had not been approved by the Central Committee in Shanghai and Mao's chances of success in the countryside looked slim. He was kicked out of the ruling Politbureau as well as the party Front Committee, but together with Chu went ahead with plans to establish a government on the Russian Soviet model.

The first Soviet came into being in the Hunan-Kiangsi-Kwangtung border area. Gradually the Soviet areas expanded under the protection of the growing Red military forces.

Chu Teh was the Red Army's first commander-in-chief and Mao its political commissar.

The army, often referred to as the Chu-Mao Army, resembled no other in China. Because it depended on the peasant for support, it was careful to cultivate him. Strict rules provided that soldiers must replace all doors when leaving a house (they were used to sleep on), return straw matting and borrowed articles, repair or replace damaged ones, pay for everything purchased and establish trench toilets away from peasant dwellings.

On the question of tactics, Mao chose the first great Chinese master of warfare as his model. Sun Tzu lived either in the sixth or the fourth century before Christ—historians are uncertain which—and was the author of "The Art of War," a text still studied by military men. He stressed secrecy, concealment, surprise and avoidance of head-on conflict. Speed, subtlety and an ability to exploit an enemy's weakness also were important. Mao summed up these ideas: "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when he halts and camps, we harass him; when he seeks to avoid battle, we attack; when he retreats, we pursue."

What you should know about



The Long March, a 6,000-mile military retreat across China. Of the 100,000 men who started, only 20,000 finished one year later. Enroute, the columns seized 62 cities, scaled 18 mountain ranges and crossed 24 rivers.

The army had its ups and downs. The "Stalinists" still made policy and they threw it against Changsha once more. The result was disaster and it ended the policy of trying to swarm over the big cities rather than concentrating on building bases in the countryside. But by this time, Generalissimo Chiang had been stirred to action. With 100,000 men, he carried out in late 1930 the first of five Extermination Campaigns against the Soviets. Employing Sun Tzu's strategy, the Communists beat them back. The government returned to the attack a few months later with 200,000 men under Ho Ying-chin as Minister of War. It also was repelled. A month later, Chiang himself threw 300,000 men into the fray, maneuvering swiftly with only 30,000 men, the Reds chopped them to pieces.

In 1932, the Communists themselves went on the offensive, capturing several medium-sized cities in Fukien Province. Meanwhile, Chiang prepared for his fourth campaign with 250,000 men; it was the most disastrous of all.

Chiang brought in German advisers for his fifth campaign which employed nearly a million men. They adopted a new kind of warfare using blockhouses and fortifications. Germans at that period were fashionable as advisers. The Comintern supplied the Communists a young man named Otto Braun, who knew next to nothing



Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

about military tactics. Braun met the new tactics with positional warfare, rather than keeping the army flexible as Mao had done. The government forces replied by moving their ring of fortifications progressively closer to the Communist center. The Communists faced defeat. A million people in the Soviet areas had already died of

Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, left, became allies in the Communist cause at the end of the Long March. Mao was made party chairman, the post he holds today.

starvation as a result of the successful blockade. The Long March was the answer.

Begun in mid-October 1934, the Long March was one of the great military feats of history. It also was an impressive example of the tenacity of faith. The Communists, rightly or wrongly, believed they held the key to future Chinese greatness. They were willing to make any sacrifice, indulge in any deception, perform any cruelty to bring about the triumph of the alien ideas they had borrowed from Germany and Russia. They could have surrendered and won places of power and esteem among the Nationalists; some did. But the majority persisted.

The Long March was, in fact, a retreat across 6,000 miles of China from the East coast to Shensi Province in the distant Northwest. It began in mid-October 1934 with 100,000 men, when it ended a year later, there were 20,000 left. Along the tortuous route they fought a skirmish, sometimes a battle, an average of once a day.

The columns—there were several—wound across a dozen provinces, seized 62 cities, clambered over 18 mountain ranges and crossed 24 rivers. Food was a constant problem. Many men were reduced to eating the bark of trees or drinking their own urine. Wild animals, snakes and fierce aboriginal tribes often barred the way.

It was an orderly retreat, during which the army handed out Communist propaganda, held mass meetings, staged plays and carried out land reform.

The first two-and-a-half months of the trek nearly were the last. The main column was commanded by Chu Teh, but Mao had been replaced as political commissar by Chou En-lai. For some still obscure reason, Mao was under a cloud, possibly because of his anger at the adoption of the fatal positional tactics against the final extermination drive. The youthful Red leaders were long on theory but short on practice. Their first blunder was to load the march down with all the impedimenta of the abandoned Soviet areas. It took a transport division of 5,000 men to move this excess baggage. Thus encumbered, Braun ordered the column to march in a straight line toward the Northwest, a move which sent it into head-on conflict with the waiting government forces.



Crossing the Hsiang River in North Kiangsi resulted in loss of half the army.

At this point Mao asserted himself, persuading the leadership to move by more circuitous routes to Kweichow Province where the enemy was weaker. Through a classic trick—he disguised his soldiers as Kuomintang troops—Lin Piao captured Tsunyi and there Mao had a showdown with the chastened leaders. The debate during what is now called the Tsunyi Conference took place the first week of January 1935. When it had ended, Mao was party chairman, the post he holds today, and he had gained an important ally: Chou En-lai.

Now at last he was in a position of power from which he could carry out his ideas on the role of the peasant in revolution. But his immediate concern was survival. Before resuming the march, he divested the column of its surplus weight and announced that the Communist objective in struggling to the Northwest was to confront the Japanese invader. Widely published, that statement won for the Reds the sympathy of much of a country grown impatient with Chiang's single-minded pursuit of the civil war and his reluctance to turn against the Japanese armies.

For much of the remainder of the march, the Communist armies outwitted the government forces by complicated maneuvers, twists and turns and elaborate feints. The imagination of Mao was evident in these tactics.

Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun

The survivors of the Long March formed an elite within the Chinese party which would dominate it for many years. They had suffered, fought and bled together. They had shared victories and defeats. As their revolution dragged on they acquired the aura of legend. Later, after the party came to power, those who cherished the old ways and believed that they were the surest and best, would come into conflict with progressive elements. More particularly, there would be the Maoists, adherents of Chinese nationalism, and those who looked beyond Chinese shores to the great world outside. In the moment of success the seeds of future strife had been sown.

Under the influence of militarism, the Japan of the 1930s sought to cure its domestic ills—the steady impoverishment of the farmer—by expansionism. Manchuria, the richest part of China industrially and in the extent of its resources, seemed a perfect setting for the economic reforms the Japanese military wished to introduce. They had rested secure in their holdings there following World War I until the Generalissimo captured Peking in 1928, forcing Manchuria's warlord ruler, Chang Tso-lin, to relinquish his hold on the capital city.

The Japanese had long been doubtful about the loyalty of their puppet collaborator Chang Tso-lin. A warlord in the classic manner. Short, stocky and addicted to Napoleonic hats, he received visits on a throne flanked by ferocious looking stuffed tigers.

In fact, he was mild-mannered, polite and physically rather frail. He could be forgiven a little display. Starting life as a pig keeper, unencumbered by education, he rose through the profitable pursuits of brigandry to immense wealth and great political power (he was president of warlord China, with his capital in Peking, when the Northern Expedition approached in 1928), chiefly because he had the innovative idea of concerning himself with the welfare of his troops. Much addicted to the pleasures of the bed and board, he wasted little time on ideology. But the Japanese thought him too friendly to the United States and Britain. On June 3, 1928, while returning to Mukden from Peking, his exquisitely appointed private train struck a Japanese mine and leaped into the air. The Old Marshal, after lingering a while, died.

His successor, Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang,

was 22 and more nationalist than his father. Bland-faced and bespectacled, he had none of his vices. One of the first things he did was to join the Kuomintang. The Japanese booted him out of Manchuria. He brought much of his army with him and based it on Sian, the capital of Shensi.

The Generalissimo planned to use the Young Marshal's troops for his sixth and last knockout punch against the Communists. He believed rightly that the Reds were weak and disorganized after their terrible ordeal and would be easy picking. In making his plans, Chiang ignored Communist appeals for a united Kuomintang-Communist front against the Japanese. He knew, as the Communists did, that they needed a breathing spell if they were to survive.

Plan For United Front

But not all Chinese were so intent on destroying the Communists. Soon after arriving in Shensi, Chou En-lai had contacted the Young Marshal and won him over to the united front idea. His troops were chafing after their long absence from their homes and believed that the Generalissimo should be fighting the Japanese rather than the Communists.

Early in December 1936, the Gimo flew to Sian to coordinate the campaign against the Communists. Instead, he found himself kidnapped by the Young Marshal's troops. They demanded he halt the civil war and face towards Manchuria rather than Shensi. The Gimo coldly refused. The young officers of the Manchurian forces wanted to kill him. The man who saved his life, ironically, was Chou En-lai.

Chou and the Communists decided that the Generalissimo was more valuable alive than dead. They recognized that he stood as a symbol to millions of Chinese. And his death would have turned power over to Ho Ying-chin, an extremist the Reds distrusted. Madame Chiang flew to Sian to lend her assistance; the Gimo, she explained, had a terrible temper and had to be soothed. When Chou met Chiang, the Kuomintang leader paled; it was their first encounter since he had put a price on the young Communist's head in 1927. But Chou did not seek vengeance. He tried to persuade Chiang to accept the



Tientsin, August 1937. Japanese warplanes hammer Chiang's forces at will, seizing Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow and Canton in swift succession and exacting an immense toll in human lives.

common front. Chiang remained obdurate, but as each day passed it became clear he would give in. Finally, with no agreements signed and no verbal promises made, Chiang left Sian. With him went the Young Marshal; in a gesture to save the Gimo's "face," he had voluntarily made himself a prisoner. He remains under house arrest in Taiwan until this day.

After the death of Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese had rapidly consolidated their hold on Manchuria. In 1932 they turned it into the State of Manchukuo with the last Chinese emperor, Pu Yi, on its puppet throne. In July 1937, they began their full-scale invasion of North China. Two months later, Chiang wound up negotiations with the Communists and accepted their united front proposals. They included an end to the civil conflict, release of all political prisoners, grant of democratic freedoms to all, immediate steps to resist the Japanese armies and a conference to examine the future of China.

In return, the Communists agreed to give up their policy of armed rebellion, to place their border regions in the Northwest (the word Soviet had been dropped) under the government as "special regions," make their army part of the government's, introduce democratic elections and halt land seizure.

The united front worked for two years. During that time, resistance by the allied forces was spirited and often successful. But after 1939 it was more honored in the breach than the observance. The most serious clash between the two occurred in 1941 when government forces all but destroyed the Red New Fourth Army as it was crossing the Yangtze River under Chiang's orders.

United or not, the Chinese were seldom a match for the better organized, better disciplined, better equipped Japanese armies. From July 1937 to late 1938 the Japanese advanced swiftly. Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow and Canton fell in succession. Chiang fell back to Chungking, at the confluence of the Yangtze and Gialing rivers in Szechuan. Even there they were not safe from the Japanese; warplanes hammered it at will, exacting an immense toll in human life.

All this served to weld the Chinese into a dogged resistance. The Japanese-occupied cities were emptied of patriotic students, clerks, laborers and ordinary Chinese who streamed, by foot and river steamer, to the distant wartime capital. Not since the heady days of nationalism in the 1920s had there been such enthusiasm and solidarity.

In the occupied areas, the Communists organized

guerrilla units, set up local governments and self-defense units. These harassed the railways and population centers which the Japanese controlled. For the first time in history, Chinese in the rural regions, and not those in the major cities, wielded power.

World War II Begins

In 1941 the Japanese made a fatal error. It was called Pearl Harbor. It united the United States. For the first time since the invocation of the Open Door, the United States was preparing to use force to restore the territorial integrity of China.

Chinese hopes were high. Until 1941 the only major foreign aid had been that of the Soviet Union which had contributed \$250 million in war materiel. Stalin was not entirely disinterested: he feared that the Japanese might,

after defeating China, strike into weakly-defended Siberia.

But American priorities were in Europe, not Asia. Madame Chiang went to Washington to appeal to Roosevelt, but he resisted her charm. She angered him by taking China's case to the American public.

By the beginning of 1944, the Americans felt better able to turn their attention to the Chinese. That China would not become the central theater of the war against Japan became evident as Gen. Douglas MacArthur moved up the string of islands which pointed like a lance at Tokyo. The Americans agreed, however, to reopen a supply route into China to replace the access roads cut off by the Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia. Premier T. V. Soong suggested an airlift from Assam to Kunming in Yunnan Province. He described the intervening ter-

rain as relatively level. That was the understatement of the century: the only obstacle was the Himalayan mountain range, the highest in the world, which included Mt. Everest. [The author flew over it in 1945 and found it far from flat.]

In addition to setting up an air base and supply depot in Kunming, the Americans undertook to train 30, later 39, Chinese divisions. The man chosen for this job, Gen. Joseph Stilwell, knew China like the inside of his pocket. He had first seen it briefly in 1911, the year of the overthrow of the Manchus, while on leave from the Philippines. He spent the years 1920-1923 in Peking as a language officer, saw the emergence of nationalism from 1926 to 1929 as an infantry officer in Tientsin, and had been a military attache from 1935 to 1939. He spoke Chinese fluently, knew most of the principals in the drama

being played out on the mainland, and was familiar with Chinese history. Brilliant, outspoken, picturesquely profane, warmly human and sometimes savagely witty, his nickname was "Vinegar Joe." His creased face, stiff shock of hair and owl-like glance did, indeed, give him a vinegary look.

Impatient with corruption, inefficiency and political scheming, he enormously admired the ordinary Chinese. He wanted them to defeat the Japanese and enjoy a better life. Anything which interfered with that aroused his ire.

When Stilwell arrived, another famous American already had the ear of the Generalissimo. He was Claire L. Chennault, a former school teacher whose deafness forced him to give up a career as a fighter pilot with the U.S. Air Force.

In 1937, Chiang engaged Chennault to form a



1942: Encountering muddy terrain on the Chinese battlefield, the disciplined Japanese troops adopted ancient techniques to modern warfare—mules, horses and carts.



1943: Lt. Gen. Joseph Stilwell, left, chats with Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault at a 14th Air Force base somewhere in China. Stilwell's trademarks—the campaign hat and musette bag.

Chinese air force. Since there were no available Chinese, he recruited Americans who, flying under the name of "The Flying Tigers," dramatized the Chinese war effort in the United States. Chennault then was 47 years old, large and tough in an American way, his face craggy and weather-beaten. He was innocent of any profound knowledge of China, its language or its people but thought Madame Chiang the loveliest woman he had met. A devoted believer in the efficacy of air power, he boasted that with a score of bombers he could wipe out the Japanese air force, reduce Japan to submission and win the war. The truth was otherwise.

Chiang, whose word Chennault never questioned, understandably preferred him to Stilwell who could not resist criticizing when things went wrong. Stilwell knew enough about Chinese politics to pinpoint the blunders. It did not endear him to Chiang or the Kuomintang right wing. In any case, the Gimo was a disappointed man. The Americans had not, even so late in the game, landed in China with a million men, nor had they opened their purses to give the billions of dollars Chiang wanted to prosecute the war. They had grudgingly loaned \$500 million and were hesitant about giving more.

When Stilwell arrived, the Chinese nationalist army numbered some three million poorly fed, badly trained men lacking in morale and esprit de corps. Many recruits had been rounded up in the villages, tied together with ropes and marched off to the induction centers. Not surprisingly they were signally lacking in enthusiasm.

Stilwell began the job of training them in India, then continued it in Yunnan. By the simple process of giving them enough food, treating their illnesses, instilling pride in themselves and their units, he made them into a superior fighting force. At the same time, he pressed for an opportunity to work with the Communists, whose military ability he admired.

Roosevelt's vice president, Henry Wallace, made an eight-day trip to Chungking where he talked of hybrid corn (he had been secretary of agriculture) and raised the question of establishing a U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Yenan. Its function would be to gather intelligence on Communist military capabilities and help in the rescue of downed American pilots.

On July 12, 1944, Col. David D. Barrett, like Stilwell a long-time observer of the China scene, set up the Yenan Mission. Among the small group of Americans was John Stewart Service, a young diplomat attached to Stilwell's headquarters. One of the later visitors, John Paton Davies, was, like Service, the son of missionary parents and had been born in China.

These two diplomatic officers traveled widely and met many Chinese. Their judgments were exceptionally shrewd and perceptive. They were quick to see that the Communists were nominally subservient to Moscow but that there were elements which could ultimately lead to a split with the Russians. They feared that rivalry between Chiang and the Communists would result in all-out resumption of the civil war and push the Reds back into the arms of Moscow. They described Chiang's government as "organically weak" and likely to fail unless it instituted reforms. If it engaged in a civil war with the Communists the result, they said, would be defeat.

The two Americans suggested that Chiang could survive if he brought the Communists into a coalition government. Failing this they urged the U.S. to cooperate with the Communists to influence them away from the Soviet Union.

Relations With Chiang Worsen

Davies made a prophetic observation: "The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs."

The military situation, like the economy, deteriorated rapidly in 1944. On April 17, the Japanese knifed southward across the Yellow River in a campaign to take the Peiping-Hankow railroad. The entire Honan front disintegrated soon after. Hunan was next and on Nov. 12, the strategic airbase at Kweilin fell.

On July 7, Roosevelt sent a message to the Generalissimo which advised him he was promoting Stilwell to full general and urged that he be put in over-all command of American and Chinese forces. Recognizing that relations between "Vinegar Joe" and Chiang were uncomfortable, the president said he had named Gen. Patrick J. Hurley to act as his personal representative to deal with the Gimo on political matters.

In August, 1945, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, the U.S. ambassador to China, right, flew to the Communist capital in Yenan and brought Mao to Chungking. His purpose was to have Mao meet Chiang Kai-shek and attempt to avert possible civil war.



Despite his agreement in principle, Chiang put off a decision. Roosevelt, ruffled, sent another message on Aug. 23 which said, "I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with a loss of the critical area in East China with possible catastrophic results."

Stilwell's own assessment was equally gloomy.

Hurley, now on the scene, advised that Stilwell's relations with Chiang were going from bad to worse. Something had to give. Roosevelt recalled Stilwell and named Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer to take his place. The question of over-all command died on the vine.

Hurley, the president's special envoy, was a Republican former secretary of war. Tall, florid faced, handsome, he had a bristling mustache and an inordinate pride in his part-Cherokee Indian origin. On the way to China he had met Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov and discussed the China situation. The Soviet leader said the Communists were not Communist at all and Russia would be happy if the United States undertook to unify the country.

Thus fortified, Hurley made it his mission to bring together the Nationalist and Communist military forces into a united front against Japan.

In November 1944, he arrived unannounced in Yenan. The startled Communists turned out an honor guard, which he reviewed. Then he drew himself up to his full height and let out an Indian war whoop. It was a gaudy beginning to the American mediation effort in China.

During his stay in Yenan, he persuaded Mao to sign an agreement he had drawn up which read like the Bill of Rights and the Atlantic Charter. Essentially, it called for reorganization of the government into a coalition of all anti-Japanese parties and implicitly promised the Communists a share in American military and economic aid. Mao, dubious because Hurley hadn't presented it yet to the Nationalists, signed. To show his good will the American special envoy added his own signature.

Chiang, predictably, rejected the draft and made a

counterproposal which the Communists regarded as surrendering their armies to the government. They rejected it. But the negotiations were not dead.

On Nov. 1, 1944, the American ambassador, Clarence Gauss, resigned and Hurley succeeded him. He presented his credentials in Chungking on Jan. 8, 1945.

On Jan. 11, Mao proposed a conference in Chungking to prepare for a National Affairs Conference. Chou went to the capital later that month for talks with Nationalist leaders. The sticking point was, in Chou's words, an unwillingness by the Communists to place their troops under the command of the Kuomintang party. They would, however, be willing to put them under the national government once the Kuomintang's one-party rule had been turned into a coalition of all parties. The talks adjourned without tangible progress. Chiang complicated matters by announcing that he would call the one-party National Congress into session on Nov. 12.

The bargaining went on between Chungking and Yenan, each side distrustful of the other but unwilling to take the responsibility for a break which would plunge the country into civil war.

In the closing days of August and three months before his own resignation, Hurley pulled a coup. He went to Yenan and returned to Chungking with Mao himself. What had made Mao take so unexpected a step? The announcement of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 may have been the reason. It stipulated that the Russians would give aid and support only to the national government of China. It was time for the Communists to become part of that government.

The Yalta Agreement

The Sino-Soviet Treaty grew out of the Feb. 4-11 meeting at Yalta of President Roosevelt, Soviet Premier Stalin and British Prime Minister Churchill. They agreed



Communist columns drilling at the cave city in Yenan.

that Russia should, within three months of Germany's surrender, enter the war against Japan on the side of the allies. The conditions were that the independence of Outer Mongolia continue to be recognized; Southern Sakhalin be returned to Russia; Dairen in Manchuria be internationalized, with Russia's "preeminent interest" there recognized; the Soviet lease of Port Arthur be restored; the South Manchurian railway be operated by a joint Sino-Soviet company, and the Kuriles handed over. As a sweetener, Stalin offered to conclude a treaty with Chiang.

Chiang, though not present, had little alternative to signing the Yalta agreement; the areas mentioned were not then his to withhold. The Russians kept their part of the bargain and hurled their troops into Manchuria in the early days of August. At almost the same time, the United States laid waste to Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the world's most terrible weapon, the atom bomb. On Aug. 14, the day the Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed, the Japanese surrendered.

During the treaty negotiations, the United States suddenly remembered the Open Door and sought to get a formal Soviet statement of Stalin's earlier oral promise to honor it. The Americans were willing to hand over chunks of Manchuria but they didn't want to let the Soviets have a monopoly on trade and other business interests there. Stalin said he would do something about it. In the general confusion of war's end, nothing was done.

Mao remained in Chungking from Aug. 28 to Oct. 11. Before he left, agreement was announced on the convening of a multiparty Political Consultative Council which would make recommendations for a draft constitution as well as lay plans for China's economic reconstruction. It also would set the date for a national congress to approve these measures. The Communists accepted a compromise of 20 on the number of divisions they would have in the new national army of 100 divisions.

These main points were the basis for the long and complicated negotiations which preoccupied the Communists, the government and the United States for the next two years.

In November 1945, Hurley returned to the United States and submitted his resignation. He had some sharp things to say about American foreign policy. He charged that in China it "did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional service men sided with the Chinese Communists armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against itself."

These accusations, directed at Service and Davies, formed the basis of a campaign later developed by Republican Sen. Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin which sought to blame the Democrats for the "loss" of China. The two Americans were repeatedly cleared of disloyalty charges but it was not until 1971, and the new Nixon policy, that they were finally and fully vindicated.

The Marshall Mission

The battle—political and military—now had been joined. Though no one at first acknowledged it, both the government and the Communists were maneuvering for favorable positions before the final showdown came. There would be many months of negotiation interspersed with armed clashes between the old antagonists, but come it would. And the key to victory would be Manchuria, the cockpit of China where Japanese imperialists and those of czarist and Red Russia had been at each others' throats for half a century.

Lieutenant Gen. Wedemeyer, Stilwell's replacement, saw the situation clearly. On Nov. 14, he reported that the Generalissimo was totally unprepared to occupy Manchuria against Communist resistance and recommended

a British-American-Soviet trusteeship there until Chiang could take over.

"One of the principal reasons which led General Wedemeyer to the above conclusions," said the White Paper, "was his conviction that national government abuses and malpractices had already created serious discontent among the local population in areas taken over from the Japanese and even this soon after the end of the war against Japan, had seriously alienated a considerable amount of sympathy for the national government."

On Nov. 27, President Harry S. Truman announced the appointment of Gen. George Catlett Marshall as his special representative, with ambassadorial rank, to use American influence for the "unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods" and help bring about a cease-fire, particularly in North China where the fighting was most serious. Truman instructed him to speak to

Gen. George Catlett Marshall arriving in Yenan and meeting the Communist leaders. Left to right are: Chou En-lai, Marshall, Chu Teh, Lin Piao, and Mao Tse-tung.



Chiang and the other leaders "with the utmost frankness" and let them know that a China torn by civil war could not expect American military aid or economic credits.

In Marshall, Truman had chosen one of the ablest and most distinguished figures in American public life. He had been chief of staff during the critical days of the war and had the requisite negotiating virtues of patience, firmness, integrity and undoubted honesty. An erect, soldierly figure, his homely face was as American as the Grand Canyon. He inspired respect in all who dealt with him.

The Communists heard the news of Marshall's appointment in Yen'an and shared their pleasure with four foreign correspondents—three Americans and a Frenchman—who had arrived there the day before. Based in Chungking, they were the first to visit the blockaded and little-known Communist capital since the end of the war. This writer was one of them.

The Scene At Yen'an

The Marshall Mission created a sharply increased American interest in the Chinese Communists, their way of life, their objectives and the men and women who led them. In America there was even doubt that they in fact were Communists. Molotov had encouraged the belief that they merely represented dissatisfied elements in the Chinese population, and Stalin had told visiting Americans they were radicals—red on the outside but white within. Some Americans called them "agrarian reformers." Even Secretary of State Byrnes in his instructions to Marshall referred to them as "the so-called Communists." Here was an opportunity to learn more about them. *The Associated Press* urged me to stay behind to cover the Communist aspects of the negotiations. The other three correspondents returned to their bases in a few weeks; I remained in Yen'an for four months, then returned late in 1946 for two more.

A primitive city of 50,000, Yen'an sits astride the camel caravan routes which lead to Inner Mongolia and North China. The sands of the nearby Gobi Desert have laid down over the centuries the tawny loess hills which are characteristic of Northwest China. In 1938, Japanese bombers leveled the city leaving only its walls standing. Refusing to leave, the Communists dug 10,000 caves in

the hills, where they lived, worked and studied.

There were cave hospitals, universities, party schools, radio stations, printing presses, nurseries, stores and dwellings. A Tang dynasty pagoda standing on one of the hills provided a link between old China and the Communist present.

In the single city street, which the city's merchants had rebuilt within the walls, furs, bolts of cheap cloth, pots, pans, locally-made carpets, baskets, brassware and salt were on sale. In one building a docile mule powered a crude wool-combing machine.

The Communists lived a spartan life, their food rationed, their clothes faded and patched and their pleasures few.

Horses and camels were more numerous than automobiles. The party leadership moved about in antiquated luxury in the rear of a sedan, converted into a truck, donated by a San Francisco Chinese association. There was no electricity except in the American Mission which had a gasoline generator of its own. Oil lamps and candles supplied the only light. Charcoal braziers furnished a tiny glow of heat in the chilly caves. There was, however, a perfectly functioning telephone system, captured intact from a Japanese headquarters company.

The desert dryness and the altitude of about 2,000 feet gave the air an invigorating quality and magnified the size of the stars which glowed in the clear black sky.



A Tang dynasty pagoda stood on one of the hills of the cave city in Yen'an.



AP Correspondent John Roderick, left, interviewed Mao Tse-tung, right, in Yen'an in 1945. "Mr. Roderick," said Mao, "we are Communists but we also are Chinese, and we like good food . . . You are a guest and nothing is too good for a guest. We don't eat like this all the time."

The Communist chieftains staged performances of the Peking Opera, which Mao enjoyed, in a barn-like building open to the blasts of winter. Occasionally they attended the movies at the U.S. Mission. Abbott and Costello were favorites.

On Meeting Mao

Once a week the Reds staged a dance in one of the halls of the Military Compound across the Yenho River where Mao and the party leaders lived. It was at one of these dances that I first met Mao.

The Chungking negotiations had exhausted him both physically and emotionally. Under treatment by Soviet doctors, he had withdrawn from active party affairs and left them for a while to Chou, Chu Teh and the No. 2 man in the party, Liu Shao-chi.

Despite the strain, he retained the look of youth in his round face. His hair, receding in the front, gave him the high forehead which was one of the distinguishing features of his later years. His eyes, hidden behind narrowed lids, peered out at the world quizzically, without hostility, but with no particular warmth. The mole, which became more prominent later, was visible on his chin. There was a faint smile on his straight firm mouth and his shoulders drooped slightly. He looked confident, resourceful, thoughtful and not especially ferocious. But his head seemed massive and leonine. It was impossible to guess from his smooth face and soft hands that he was an outlaw, still carrying a government price on his head, or that he had borne the pain of a wife and sister executed by the Nationalists, another wife stricken ill during the

Long March, or that his family had been outcasts and his friends imprisoned simply because they had known him.

On the dance floor he looked like an out-sized doll in his padded winter clothing. He waltzed with conviction, usually with a pig-tailed girl half his size.

Several weeks passed before he felt strong enough for an interview. He met me at the door of his simple mud and frame house, shook hands and steered me to a chair. His conversation, at first rambling and full of small talk, turned serious when he spoke of the problems of China. He leaned forward to peer into my eyes, as though searching for some clue to my identity which he could file in the ordered cells of his mind. The experience was troubling; I felt as though I were somehow on trial.

We talked of Marshall and the progress of the negotiations. He praised the American envoy and thanked the United States but warned against what he called Chiang's duplicity. There was room, he said, in the future China for trade with the United States. He raised the possibility that American mail order houses might establish themselves in China. The Communists were interested, he said, only in achieving democracy. Communism could wait until the country had gone through a period of controlled capitalism. The prospects were bright.

While he talked, Mao chain-smoked and drank hot tea. He had always been careless of his personal appearance and now he was dressed in untied, scuffed sneakers and a worn blue tunic patched at the elbows.

He enjoyed eating, particularly the peppery food of his native Hunan, a cuisine said to have produced a greater than normal share of Chinese revolutionaries. At

dinner, he told me that the fish had been brought especially from a stream 50 miles away. I marveled at the variety and richness of the fare and observed that it didn't seem very Communist. "Mr. Roderick," he said with a smile, "we are Communists but we also are Chinese, and we like good food. Also, you are a guest and nothing is too good for a guest. We don't eat like this all the time."

When I met him, Mao was 52 and at the peak of his physical and mental powers despite the illness which briefly incapacitated him.

Mao's Thoughts

The Kiangsi Soviets and the Long March had left him little time for reading or for writing. His most fruitful years were in Yen-an. There he wrote about the problems of warfare, particularly that against the Japanese, and of the shape of tomorrow's China.

In 1938, he published his famous essay, "On Protracted War," which spelled out the role in backward countries of the villages and the peasants in overthrowing the big cities and thus achieving victory for the revolution. Years later, in 1965, Lin Biao applied the concept globally, identifying Asia, Africa and Latin America as the "villages" of the earth and North America and Western Europe as the "cities" which would topple before them.

War preoccupied Mao. Like so many idealists, he spoke in riddles.

"We are advocates of the abolition of war," he said. "We do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun."

He saw war as a necessary evil. "Revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power and can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation."

All this boiled down to one sentence: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

In 1940, turning to politics, he proposed that China undergo a democratic phase... "not democracy in the general sense, but a new and specific kind, i.e., new democracy." Controlled capitalism would exist in the transi-

tional stage to socialism. He elaborated on these ideas in his 1945 report to the Seventh Party Congress in a paper called "On Coalition Government."

Once and for all, he set the record straight.

"We Communists never conceal our political opinions. Our future program, or the maximum program, is to push China forward to socialism and communism; that is definite and beyond question. The name of our party and our Marxist world outlook clearly indicate this future, this infinitely bright, infinitely beautiful and most ideal direction."

Wars come and go and so do political institutions. But culture is the thread which holds civilizations together, giving them meaning and continuity. In 1942, Mao laid down in talks before the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art, the basis of Communist culture.

There could be no art for art's sake, he said. The nation's peasants were ignorant, illiterate and superstitious. It was the job of the Red intellectual to raise their understanding. To reach them, the simplest kind of language and the most easily understood forms of art must be employed. To gain an insight into the hopes, fears, lives and problems of the peasants and workers, the artist must go into the fields and factories.

"If you want the masses to understand you and want



Mao Tse-tung with wife, Chiang Ching.

to become one with them, you must be determined to undergo a long and even painful process of remodeling," he said.

There was no room in all this for the idea of "love of mankind." "There has been no such all-embracing love since humanity was divided into classes," he said. "We cannot love our enemies, we cannot love social evils, and our aim is to exterminate them. How can our artists and writers fail to understand such a common sense matter?"

Real love will be realized, he added, when class distinctions are abolished.

Mao's hope was to see a masterpiece about the worker or the peasant.

Mao Remarries

Besides enlarging his own knowledge of Marxism and turning out theses on war and politics, written in his candlelit Yen-an cave, Mao found time for love. In 1949, he married a former Shanghai movie actress named Chiang Ching. It was his fourth marriage and her third.

Mao's first wife was a girl he hardly knew. Their marriage had been arranged without their consent, in the classic manner, by their parents. It was not consummated. His second wife, Yang Kai-hui was the daughter of a Peking University professor. Captured before the Long March, in 1930, she was executed by the Kuomintang after prolonged torture. Years afterwards, in 1957, he wrote a poem in which he called her "my proud poplar." The third wife, Ho Tzu-chen, made the long and painful trek across China with him and became ill. She was sent to Moscow to recover. Active in party matters and well-liked by the party leaders, she had borne Mao five children.

There is little solid information on Chiang Ching's early years. In fact, following her marriage to Mao, people who recalled her youth saw her either as a modern-minded woman or as a lady of rather too easy virtue; it depended on the politics of the narrator.

Born in Chucheng, Shantung, her name was Luan Shu-meng and her parents were poor. When she was born is not certain. It was sometime between 1910 and 1915. Her name changed several times. She took her grandfather's name when he adopted her and became Li Ching-

yun. She was Lan Ping as an actress and Chiang Ching after marrying Mao.

She was a library clerk in Tsinan and later went to Tsingtao where she became a librarian at the university. One of the students, Yu Chi-wei, changed his name to Huang Ching, became a Communist, met and married Chiang Ching, and introduced her to Marxist ideas. Both were jailed for radical activities in 1934 and on their release went south to Shanghai. Soon after, he either divorced or deserted her. He died in Canton after a long illness in 1958 at the age of 47.

Left alone in Shanghai, some accounts say she was not lonely. Besides joining a left-wing motion picture company, she fulfilled her long-held desire to play the role of Nora in Ibsen's "A Doll's House" on the stage. Her sponsor as an actress was the film critic, Tang Na. Her stage name of Lan Pin meant "Blue Apple." Determinedly progressive, she married Tang Na in a much-photographed and publicized civil ceremony at Hangchow; three other movie couples participated.

She quit Shanghai just before the big Japanese attack in 1937, leaving Tang Na behind; the marriage had been tempestuous. By successive stages she reached Yen-an where, thanks to an introduction by Kang Sheng, also a native of Shantung, she became an instructor at the Lu Hsun Art Academy.

She is said to have met Mao when he lectured at the academy, catching his eye by loud applause, copious note-taking and many questions. Soon she began visiting him to receive instructions in political matters related to the stage.

Opposition To Mao's Marriage

Mao was reported to have gone from cave to cave in Yen-an begging for the support of Chu Teh, Hsu Teh-li and Chou's wife, Teng Ying-chao, in his plan to divorce the ill and absent Ho and marry Chiang Ching. He threatened, if he failed, to return to his native village and become a farmer.

Mao and Lan Pin soon began living together, a fact which she announced to a stunned meeting of high-ranking officials one day in 1940.

Among those who opposed her marriage was Liu

Shao-chi. This could explain the evident hatred she felt for Liu and his wife, Wang Kuang-mei. Chiang Ching was in the forefront of those urging the Red Guards to subject her to criticism and humiliation during the later Cultural Revolution.

Kang Sheng, who supported the marriage, appears to have benefited proportionately. Though his career was less distinguished than many others, he has risen higher than most. Whether he continues to survive in 1972 is questionable. He too has vanished from the political scene.

The party finally gave its consent on condition that Chiang Ching refrain from taking part in party activities. She kept her word for more than 20 years, a record for any woman.

Pleasant-featured, somewhat tall for a Chinese girl, and the mother of two girls, Chiang Ching had none of the glamor of the stage or screen when the author met her in Yen-an. She dressed plainly, smiled often and kept in the background. She was the antithesis of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who wore clinging silk cheongsams, slit up the thigh, and created a sensation with her expensive furs and jewels during her American visit.

The second most important man in Yen-an, Liu Shao-chi, was long-faced, lugubrious-looking and spoke in a whisper. He wore a cap indoors and out.

Liu's Early Life

This was the man who two decades later would be branded a traitor, a counterrevolutionary and Mao's worst enemy. Born of poor peasants in Mao's Hunan Province, he studied in Shanghai and at Peking University. He joined the party in the year of its founding, 1921, and went to Moscow where he attended the Far Eastern University. He told me that he had been discouraged by the poverty and the backwardness of the country which had first put Marxism in practice. Returning to China, he applied the new skills he learned, recruiting laborers in the coal mines on the Kiangsi-Hunan border. In the years which followed, he won fame as a labor organizer and by 1927 had won a place on the party Central Committee. He entered the Politbureau in 1942 and in 1945 was vice-chairman of the party, Mao's heir-apparent.

In every way he was Mao's antithesis. The chairman put his faith in the peasant, while Liu saw China's future in its proletariat. Mao went on the Long March, Liu did not. Mao was a nationalist, Liu an internationalist, and one of the Moscow faction. Mao could not be bothered with details; as an organizer, Liu was preoccupied with them. Finally, their personalities were dissimilar; Mao self-assured and outspoken, Liu shy and withdrawn.

Yet, in the Yen-an of 1945, they seemed perfectly compatible. But what went on behind the closed doors of the party conferences was anyone's guess; it seemed possible that there were some sharp disagreements in these meetings, which often went on for days. But the secret was theirs.

Liu's works rivalled those of Mao in that period. One of them, "How to be a Good Communist" became a standard reference volume. It acknowledged the impact of Confucius on Chinese thought, recognized the human urges to fame and approbation. It was altogether more human than Mao's strictures. But was it pure Marxism? The Maoists said it was not.

Old "Red Virtue" Chu Teh celebrated his 60th birthday—a propitious one in China—during the time I was in Yen-an. On meeting him it was difficult to remember that here was one of the most celebrated masters of guerrilla warfare anywhere. The army's commander-in-chief looked old and mellow beyond his years. His thinning hair, squat, homely face, wide mouth and quick, face-crinkling smile gave him the appearance of a kindly grandfather. There was little evidence of the dissipation of his youth. Old-fashioned and gracefully polite, he gave thanks for a proffered cigarette with his hands joined together and a bow, in the ancient manner. He smoked through cupped hands without coming in contact with the cigarette.

It was he who met the correspondents on arrival and granted a long interview. In the succeeding months, he appeared to be the Communist spokesman, always available to discuss at length the aims, hopes and disappointments of the party.

He lived in the Date Orchard compound, originally Mao's home, with a young wife and the 6-year-old daughter of Yeh Ting, the New Fourth Army com-

mander captured in 1941 during its Yangtze River crossing.

Chu often told me that he had been motivated all his life, after the Yunnan period, by a compelling wish to eradicate poverty from China. Sitting one night in his cave while snowflakes settled gently outside, he said: "I have helped carve out a territory here in Northwest China where human beings may live secure from arrest and terror, free to practice democratic self-government. I have lived to see the democracy we established demanded in the rest of China, which now lives in chaos and under oppression. For this I am grateful."

At 60, he already was a legend as "father" of the army. Like the other Communists he had a price tag on his head. His was impressive: a quarter of a million dollars.

Politically, he appeared to have no overweening ambitions. He was a simple military man who left political matters to men like Mao. Years later, he became chair-

man of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress but lost that in the Cultural Revolution. Now senile, he performed one signal service for Mao during that tumultuous time. At a crucial meeting of the Politbureau, he cast the deciding vote which kept Mao in power and started Liu Shao-chi on the road to disgrace.

Meeting With Chou

Chou En-lai, dressed in a long coat with a fur collar and wearing a Western-style hat, commuted between Yen-an and Chungking for the Marshall Mission negotiations. Then 47, he had the vigor and stamina of a man 10 years younger. I had met him in Chungking, before coming to Yen-an, in the presence of the Red Army's spokesman, Madame Kung Peng. Madame was too stiff a word for Kung Peng. Of wealthy origins, like Chou, she was pretty, vivacious and tough when she wanted to be. Correspondents met her in the Red headquarters, a plain house on a rubbish-littered Chungking lane, where she



AP Correspondent John Roderick took this photo in Yen-an in 1947. Left to right are Chou En-lai, Gen. Chu Teh, and Mao Tse-tung. During this interview, Mao said to Roderick: "I invite you to visit me in Peiping two years from now."



lived with her small child. A string of safety pins on her blouse and a diaper in her hand were the badges of her domestic office; it didn't interfere with her Communist duties. Her husband was Chiao Kuan-hua, later deputy foreign minister and China's first representative, in 1971, to the United Nations. Kung Peng died in 1970.

In Chungking she acted as hostess for Chou who entertained often and well. Correspondents occasionally were his guests at dinners of exotic and spicy Szechuan food.

The auspices for Gen. Marshall's mission seemed favorable. The Communists and Kuomintang had indicated they were ready for compromise. The Chinese yearned for peace after so much war. And the economy was in remarkably good shape.

Events moved rapidly, and favorably, at first. On Jan. 10, 1946, the Generalissimo convened the Political Consultative Council and the same day both sides ordered a cease-fire. All troop movements, except those of Nationalist forces into Manchuria, were banned. The exception broke the back of the cease-fire agreement.

Hopes rose and fell in the ensuing months. At one time Marshall's mission appeared on the verge of success. But the government, interpreting the cease-fire agreement as applying to all areas except Manchuria, tried to seize all of it rather than solely establishing its sovereignty, to which the Communists had agreed. The government's course made clashes with the Reds based in the Manchurian countryside inevitable. Once begun, the fighting did not stop.

The Russians, sitting in Dairen and Port Arthur, didn't make matters any easier for the Nationalists, despite their treaty pledge to help only the government. They did not permit the passage of men or supplies through these two vital ports. The Soviet army also took its time withdrawing from Manchuria. When it finally pulled out it left behind mounds of Japanese weapons and ammunition which fell into the hands of the Communists.

The extremists in the Kuomintang did everything they could to sabotage Marshall. They derided him not too privately for knowing nothing of China, its language or its customs. He answered by getting Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, president of Yenching University, named ambas-



1947: General Marshall is greeted by Chiang Kai-shek, left, and Chou En-lai at right.

sador, thus adding, as he put it, 50 years of China experience to his stature.

The Communists also made life difficult for Marshall with bitter criticism over the U.S. military and economic aid being poured into Nationalist coffers but denied to them. It was a situation which also worried Marshall because it impaired his mediatory role. Orders went out to halt direct military aid but it was too late; the Communists remained resentful.

Talks Break Down

The Generalissimo provided the last straw: he insisted on attacking and capturing Kalgan in Jehol Province because it was "absolutely essential to the national welfare." When he refused also to postpone the Kuomintang-dominated National Assembly, the game was up.

On Jan. 7, 1947, Marshall issued a personal statement which said "the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist party and the Kuomintang regard each other." It was a lesson learned at enormous expense.

He scored the Kuomintang "reactionaries" and "dyed-in-the-wool Communists" who "did not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their ends." He thought the Kuomintang liberals and minority party people, "a splendid group of men," might save the situation. But they had no armies to back them; that was the tragedy of China.

After Marshall had gone, Chiang made another stab at resuming negotiations; he had achieved a position of strength and was ready for a cease-fire. Chou's reply was brief: Dissolve the "illegal" National Assembly and return the armies of both sides to the Jan. 13, 1946, military positions. The government refused.

Sixteen months of sputtering conflict had reduced the nation's economy to a shambles. Inflation ballooned—one paid for a good dinner with a suitcase full of nearly worthless Chinese dollars—and foreign exchange reserves had shrunk. A printing press currency, lack of confidence and hoarding touched off the inflation. Venal commanders took money for nonexistent divisions; it was hardly astonishing that they didn't appear later when

needed. Ho Ying-chin, the war minister, was regarded as the richest man in China.

By the end of 1946, the government had 2,600,000 men under arms and the Communists 1,100,000. The government had an air force of 2,200 planes while the Communists had none. Yet the Communists by 1947 were on the offensive in Manchuria, the government's Achilles heel.

In Manchuria, the Nationalist command divided and quarreled. Their troops came from the south and did not mix with the population. The Communists recruited theirs from Manchurians and were better received.

Red morale was high; it was dangerously low in the government forces where defections were critical.

General Wedemeyer, returning to China in July 1947 to see what could be done, found corrupt officials squeezing the peasants, rich businessmen evading taxes, government soldiers "arrogant and rude," the secret police like those of Russia and Nazi Germany. "People disappear. Students are thrown in jail. No trials and no sentences," he said.

If the Communists were to be defeated, he went on, the government had to eliminate corruption and incompetence and grant more personal liberties to the Chinese. His audience of high-ranking government officials was aghast. No one had talked to them like that before. They had lost "face." Wedemeyer apologized for his frankness and said he thought Confucius would have approved. The classical allusion did no good; his recommendations were ignored.

The battle for Manchuria centered around Mukden. It soon was cut off. Late in October 1948, Mukden fell with 300,000 government soldiers lost.

Early in 1947, the government committed 75,000 men in a wasteful and useless battle to capture Yen-an. The Communists, regarding it as symbolically important but strategically valueless, withdrew in advance. In its final days, the writer left Yen-an for Peking. Mao was at the airfield. What did he think of the future of Chinese communism now?

"Lo teh-li," he said, using my Chinese name, "I invite you to visit me in Peiping two years from now."

The People's Republic Of China



It was a prophetic sentence. Slightly less than two years later, on Feb. 3, 1949, Lin Piao's Manchurian divisions entered Peiping. On Oct. 1, Mao proclaimed the birth of the People's Republic of China before a huge throng in Tien An Men, the vast square destined to become the spiritual hub of the new nation.

The bitter and tortuous struggle begun by a dozen men meeting clandestinely on a Shanghai river boat 28 years before had ended with the triumph of the Chinese Communist party.

The government which now came into existence had all the earmarks of the coalition Mao had futilely sought to create with the Nationalists. Headed by Premier-Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, it contained non-Communist ministers representing minority parties. But in


fact, the government served only as one of the many arms of the Communist party, which exercised over-all power.

As chairman of the party, Mao was the first man of China. Liu Shao-chi, the vice-chairman, stood second, and Chou third.

The party imposed its will not only on the government but the army, and the new mass organizations of workers, peasants, youths, sports, women and other categories. These associations, with their millions of members, gave the Chinese a voice in public affairs they had never known before. Even Kuomintang generals and leading government politicians who had come over to the new regime had their own association and their own place in the new society.

Not all government employees or mass organization

Mao Tse-tung enters Peiping, 1949.



members were Communists, but they were led by party nuclei at each level which took orders from higher up. Total control of the press, radio and other forms of communications assured a unity which China had not known for centuries.

On June 30, 1949, Mao had set forth the party's goals. For the present, he said, in "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," the army, the police and the courts would be strengthened in order to defend the nation and protect "the people's interests."

The long-range objectives, more nebulous, were to advance China "from an agricultural to an industrial country, from a new democratic to a socialist society and Communist society, to abolish classes and to achieve world communism."

The divisions, disputes and purges which followed can only be understood against the background of these objectives; few in China disagreed with them basically but many opposed Mao's methods of attaining them.

Mao Goes To Moscow

Two months after the birth of the Republic, Mao was in Moscow—on his first trip abroad at the age of 56—to seek economic aid from Joseph Stalin. Just turned 70, Stalin remembered Mao's stubborn resistance to the Moscow party line. He also rightly suspected that the new Communist republic, with its huge party, would challenge Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc. The negotiations were long and tough. On Feb. 14, 1950, the two signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance aimed at Japan and the United States. The amount of aid, \$300 million in credits, did not seem munificent. For it, Russia could keep its troops in Port Arthur and maintain control over Dairen and the Chinese Changchun railways until 1952; in fact, these imperial pawns were not returned until 1954, a year after Stalin's death.

Russia also supplied complete plants and technicians to help start the first Five Year Plan in 1953.

Returning home, Mao began applying the agrarian program which he hoped would result in the final plunge into communization of all China. He began by disinheriting the landlords, many of whom were executed after



Premier Joseph Stalin, left, and Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, rear, with Mao Tse-tung on the latter's first visit to Moscow, 1950.


mass peasant trials, and redistributing their land to the poor. For a while the peasants, spurred to new enthusiasm by the joys of private ownership, boosted agricultural production.

Next, Mao formed the peasants into mutual aid teams which pooled their farm tools. In the succeeding stages they joined cooperatives whose land, livestock and farm implements were centrally owned. Resistance to these measures proved stiff. Deprived of ownership of his animals, the peasant tended to neglect their upkeep in the collective; many died.

The Great Leap Forward

Despite these drawbacks, the experiments created much new capital. This encouraged Mao to undertake in 1958 the boldest step of all: The Great Leap Forward. This was an attempt to industrialize China and move it into the socialist stage almost overnight. The rural people's commune was to be its underpinning.

The cooperatives had a single function, agricultural production. The communes were far more significant. They grouped the nation's 500 million peasants into 27,000 self-sufficient units responsible for their own local government, industry, trade, culture, militia and education as well as agriculture.



The Great Leap Forward, 1959, proved a failure.

As Mao saw it, this would be the beginning of the "withering away of the state" which lay at the basis of Marxist doctrine. As the communes developed they would bring about that form of self-government, buttressed by a new morality, which was the dream of socialism. From this it would be an easy step to communism. The state would be concerned only with foreign affairs and national defense; it would not exist domestically.

The Great Leap failed because of inadequate preparation, inefficient projects, such as backyard steel furnaces which siphoned millions of peasants away from their primary jobs in the fields, and over-optimism based on encouraging statistics later found to be false. As if these were not enough, nature dealt a further blow, destroying the harvests with floods, typhoons, drought and plagues of locusts.

Production declined for the next three years, until 1961; the start of a slow and painful recovery began only in 1962.



The words of Mao are well read.

The commune idea, a purely Chinese vision of transforming society into communism, split the Chinese party and divided international communism, driving the first nails into the scaffold of Sino-Soviet enmity.

Within the party, Liu and party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, a small, Napoleonic-looking man, objected to the idea of achieving heavy industry on the backs of the peasant. They wanted a more gradual and even development of all sectors of the economy. The defense minister, Peng Teh-huai, first of the new breed of professional soldiers, opposed using the 2,500,000-man armed forces as workers and farmers to help carry out the Great Leap. He had introduced Soviet-style uniforms and ranks into the army and wanted to see it modernized with Moscow's help. The Russians, in fact, had the year before given China the blueprint for an atom bomb.

Peng, squat-faced and ugly, was a veteran of the Long March and regarded as one of the heroes of the new China. He did not survive Mao's wrath; a long and close

association with the party chairman ended on a note of bitterness when he was fired from his job in September 1959 and replaced with Marshal Lin Piao. Peng had been backed by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

Khrushchev, now furious, withdrew Soviet aid, technicians and the atomic blueprint in 1960. The Sino-Soviet confrontation entered a new and graver stage. The first cracks had, in fact, appeared four years earlier, in 1956, when Khrushchev denounced the dead Stalin as a murderer and announced that his repressive line would

be replaced by one of liberalism at home and peaceful coexistence abroad.

Sino-Soviet Feud

Mao feared the consequences for China; he was not yet prepared to let the peasants and workers loosen their belts. He also foresaw that with Moscow's heavy hand removed, the other Communist parties would take the road to independence. The Hungarian rebellion proved him correct.



Lop Nor in China's far Northwest was the scene of the People's Republic's first nuclear weapon explosion in 1964.

The quarrel, in fact, hinged on the question of whether to encourage revolutions in Asia, Africa and South America. The Chinese favored a vigorous program of "People's War." The Russians, awed by the destructive power of nuclear weapons, sought less bellicose means.

The liberalizing movement begun by Khrushchev set up reverberations in China. Mao was apprehensive of the impact on the nation's intellectuals. He needed their skills but worried that they might be more "expert" than "Red." He decided to give them a chance to let off steam and decreed a period of free expression called, "Let all flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend." It lasted a month. The result appalled him. The criticisms reached up to the Communist system and to Mao himself. He abruptly shut it off and instituted a purge of "rightists."

In 1959, Mao stepped down, apparently under duress, as president, or chairman, of the republic. He later complained that for the next six years, though he continued as party chairman, neither Liu nor Teng Hsiao-ping consulted him on major policy matters.

The pragmatists, having taken over, dismantled Mao's priorities, downgraded heavy industry and gave first place to agriculture. The communes, decentralized and increased to 72,000, continued but were no longer vehicles for Mao's dream of instant socialism. The peasants were given private plots of land for their own use.

Two crises in 1962—the Chinese invasion of India and the implanting of Soviet missiles in Cuba—further envenomed Sino-Soviet relations. The Russians, siding with India, accused the Chinese of "big power chauvinism." The Chinese called Khrushchev an adventurer for installing the missiles and a coward when he pulled them out under American pressure.

China Explodes: The Bomb

In 1964, China succeeded on its own in exploding its first nuclear weapon, the first of a series culminating with the hydrogen bomb. The Russians, perhaps fearful the Chinese might use their dangerous new toy there, offered to form a united front against the Americans in Vietnam. As inducement, Khrushchev's successors offered to halt the polemics.

They also agreed to let the Chinese retain their ideological positions while they kept theirs and to resume economic and military aid to China.

Liu and Teng found the offer attractive, but Mao's deep distrust of Moscow proved too strong. He led a successful fight to reject it. The result was bitterness in the party and disenchantment among the Communists of North Vietnam, North Korea and Japan. The discomfort index rose in 1965 with Chinese diplomatic setbacks in the Afro-Asian bloc and the collapse of the alliance with Indonesia in the wake of a clumsy coup attempt which Peking had backed.

In Russia, the secret police had played a decisive part in the victory of the Bolsheviks and helped maintain them in power. The opposite was true in China where the army played the most important revolutionary role. Recognizing this, Mao sought to prevent military domination of the party. The problem was complicated by the fact that the leading commanders simultaneously wore military and party hats.

American escalation of the Vietnam war in 1965 alarmed Lo Jui-ching, the army's chief of staff and a member of the party Politbureau. He urged the alliance with Moscow and speeded-up modernization of the armed forces to meet a possible American invasion. Lin Piao promptly fired him.

Lin, the defense minister, aspired to the master's mantle. An inconspicuous man with little personal force or charm, he cut an unprepossessing figure standing next to Mao in his oversized greatcoat atop the Tien An Men. His voice, high and squeaky, carried no note of command. Yet he was one of the authentic heroes of the revolution.

Born in Hupeh Province of an educated and comfortably situated family, he proved to be a military genius. He graduated from Whampoa Military Academy before he was 19, took part in the Northern Expedition the next year and joined the party in 1927 at the age of 20. A protege of Chu Teh, he got his first command the same year. After a series of engagements he became, at the age of 22, a regimental commander and at 23 commander of the famed New Fourth Army.

By the time he was 25, he had become commander-in-chief of the First Army Group which broke through the

Nationalist encirclement to spearhead the Long March. During the war against the Japanese he won several major victories. Wounded, he went to Moscow for treatment and was said to have taken part in the defense of Leningrad. At the end of the civil war, he commanded an army of 800,000. Elected to the Politbureau in 1950, he became vice-chairman of the party's Military Commission, serving just under Mao as chairman.

After removing Lo Jui-ching, Lin abolished the Soviet-style ranks and marks of insignia and had the chairman's "Little Red Book" of quotations distributed throughout the armed forces. He proclaimed himself Mao's best student and closest disciple.

In the early days, the Chinese party—the world's largest—had been considered monolithically united, held together by common aims and the Long March guerrilla spirit. But size altered its shape. By 1966 it numbered about 22 million and had its own bureaucracy. The old guard, or senior party cadres, held the best jobs and were the envy of the newer officers who wanted promotion based on merit. Intellectuals, also brought into the party, refused to take the old guard's word as gospel. This set up more strains. Corruption inevitably crept in and this disillusioned the students with high ideals who had joined the party. The stage was swept and ready for some kind of upheaval.



1966: Mao swims in the Yangtze River.

It came in the form of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In launching it, Mao encouraged the nation's young to challenge the authority of the old guard; it was hardly coincidental that the same old guard had virtually deposed him.

Mao branded his opponents "revisionists" who wanted to bring about a rapprochement with the imperialists, headed by the United States, and the Russians. Domestically, he said, they dreamed of liberalizing the economy by increasing the peasants' private plots of land, enlarging the number of small, individual businesses and expanding the free market.

The opening shot in the Cultural Revolution came on Nov. 10, 1965, in the form of a biting criticism (inspired by Mao and Chiang Ching) of a play called "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office." Written by Wu Han, the deputy mayor of Peking, it was rightly interpreted as a slap by the establishment at Mao's removal of Peng Teh-huai.

Some months earlier Madame Mao had told her husband of the parlous state of the Peking Opera. She had urged its leaders to give up their "bourgeois" presentations of popular dramas about emperors, courtesans, generals and ghosts and return to the art-for-the-masses program Mao had promulgated in 1942. Believing that Mao no longer counted, they ridiculed her. It was a costly mistake. Mao had enough power left to pack the Opera off, bag and baggage, to the army.

These two incidents—the play and the Opera—prodged Mao into considering a purge of Chinese culture. Wu Han was one of the first to go, followed by leading figures in the Opera, literature, the arts and journalism. Whether by accident or design, it soon encompassed every facet of Chinese life.

At the outset Mao could rely on only three persons: his wife, Lin Piao, and Chen Po-ta, his political secretary. Aware of the divisions within the army, Mao and Lin kept it separated from the civilian phase of the revolution and ordered it to carry out its own.

The Red Guards

Mao then turned to the nation's youth to lead the revolution. They were formed into a vast organization

called the Red Guards, their number estimated at 20 million. They had no qualifications other than their youth—many were not yet in their teens—their fanaticism, and their devotion to Mao. On April 18, 1966, Lin Piao's Liberation Army Daily sounded the call to revolution, on Aug. 8, the party Central Committee stamped approval and laid down a 16-point set of rules for the purge.

On Aug. 18, Mao made a dramatic appearance before half-a-million people in Tien An Men square and gave the Red Guards his blessing by accepting an arm band pinned on by a bespectacled girl member. The Guards, his three backers, and his own immense prestige were all he had. He used them to the limit. By December he had staged eight such spectacles before 11 million people.

The Central Committee had ordered a struggle against "old ideas, culture, customs and habits." Taking these instructions literally, the Red Guards burned books which didn't follow Mao's line, banned public displays of affection, ordered women with permanent waves to straighten them out, sheared long hair short, ordered massages and pedicures discontinued in public baths, turned passengers out of pedicabs and made them pedal instead. The sale of alcohol was prohibited and smoking banned until someone remembered that Mao was a chain smoker. Street names were changed to reflect the new order. It was proposed, because red was the color of revolution, to abolish red stop-lights; everyone knew that revolution meant go, not stop. Luckily for traffic sanity, this suggestion was rejected.

Not everything was so playful. The youths paraded their teachers naked through the streets, humiliated old men and women suspected of being "bourgeois," confiscated family heirlooms, overturned gravestones, put politicians into dunce caps (perhaps one of the more sensible acts), broke into temples and burned Buddhist images. Chou prudently closed the museums and posted armed guards at their doors.

The Red Guards took on the biggest and most important members of the government, many of them Cabinet ministers. Most of Chou's vice-premiers were at one time or another subjected to harassment. They ran into one, however, who proved a hard nut to crack. He was

Chen Yi, once a marshal, a brilliant general and then minister of foreign affairs. Witty, acerbic and tough, he refused to bend before the abuse. When they taunted him with quotations from Mao, he defied them to give the full quotes and say when they were written. They couldn't. He did. The Ninth Party Congress failed to re-elect him to the Politbureau but he continued as foreign minister and a vice-chairman of the Military Commission. He died early in January 1972 after a long illness, mourned by Mao, his old friend Chou and the rest of the surviving apparatus. (He has since been succeeded by Chi Peng-fei, who had been a medical officer during the Long March.)

These activities, and the entire Cultural Revolution, were directed by a special committee headed by Chen Po-ta and advised by Madame Mao. Lin urged it on. In time, the Cultural Revolution Committee of about a dozen persons, under the orders of Mao and Lin, replaced the shattered party leadership.

Chou Tries To Moderate

Premier Chou En-lai, perceiving the approaching chaos, resolutely stepped in to act as mediator between the rival factions of Maoists which struggled for power throughout the country. His was the voice of moderation.

Chiang Ching threw herself into the fray with all the zeal of the newly converted. Her humiliation at the hands of the Opera people had turned her into a crusader for Mao. Plainly dressed in a military tunic, a cap on her head and her eyes glinting behind large, steel rimmed glasses, she took to the stump to attack her husband's real or fancied enemies.

Soon she extended her activities to the army, as well, making her the second most influential person—after her husband—in China. People in the highest places thought twice before emulating the Opera crowd. She made and broke generals, Cabinet ministers and lesser fry.

The Red Guards proved effective against individuals who could not strike back. But when they turned their young energies, in late 1966, on the big city workers and peasants they ran into a buzz saw. The workers had not forgotten Liu Shao-chi and the fact that he had helped them get higher wages, shorter hours of work and more social benefits. They reacted with strikes, sit-ins, sabotage



Women workers, left, and Red Guard members, right, parade in Peking during the pro-Mao cultural revolution, 1966.

and violence. It was the same in the rural areas where the peasants resented taking orders from children. Agricultural and industrial production slumped and counter-revolution, much talked about, seemed possible.

Mao and Lin were forced to take a fateful step. They called on the army to restore order. In a short time it became deeply involved in all aspects of the purge. Later, when Mao ordered the formation of provincial, regional and municipal revolutionary committees to replace the old politico-government units, it gained dominant positions because of its superior discipline and organizational skill.

The summer of 1967, despite the army's efforts, degenerated into one of dispute and bloodshed, as rival Red Guard units fought, each claiming to be more Maoist than Mao. The turmoil gripped the country, affecting such distant places as Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet.

In mid-July, the regional military command at Wuhan, the big industrial complex in Central China, rebelled against Peking and arrested two envoys from the Central Committee, Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li. Premier Chou En-lai flew to Wuhan to secure their release and narrowly missed arrest himself. Gunboats and paratroopers crushed the insubordinate troops after heavy fighting.

Liu Shao-chi, Teng and other anti-Maoists, confined to house arrest, were barred from carrying out their official functions and deprived of any chance to publicly answer the charges against them.

At one stage, the Red Guards hauled Teng to a mass criticism meeting, a dunce cap on his head and a huge placard around his neck. He sat in a chair because, it was said, he had broken a leg attempting suicide. Teng, then 63, was branded in the official Peking People's Daily as a renegade, a special agent and a counterrevolutionary revisionist. His crimes apparently were less lurid. He opposed the deification of Mao then being carried out by Lin Piao and insisted that the party, not the individual, ruled supreme. Worse still, he had deleted portions from the 1955 draft party Constitution referring to the importance of the thought of Mao.

Liu 'Confesses'

Liu, it appeared, was guilty of every sin in the book. Now white-haired and red-faced, he served as the revolution's whipping boy. His sacrilege was the same as Teng's: questioning the divinity of Mao. They were condemned, also, because of their ties to Moscow.

On July 9, 1967, Liu made a self-examination in which he admitted "grave mistakes," committed in ignor-

ance. He apologized, invited further criticism and ended with: "Long live the great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander, and great helmsman, Chairman Mao. A long, long life to him." These phrases, introduced by Lin, were ritual, like a Christian saying his prayers. In a subsequent self-criticism Liu protested his innocence.

One of the more active Red Guard groups was the Chinggangshan Corps at Tsinghua University, the leading Peking technological school. On a pretext (it said one of her daughters had been injured and was in the university hospital) it lured Madame Liu to the campus. There, it subjected the nation's First Lady to the indignities of three mock trials.

Each trial lasted from four to five hours; there is some likelihood she collapsed during one of them. At one point she flew into a rage and screamed: "Don't you bully me!" She wept and said her children would have to disown her. One of them, her daughter Liu Ping-ping, already had done so.

Later, both Liu and his wife appeared before a mass rally where they were forced to mouth the quotations of Mao. The Central Committee branded him a "renegade, traitor and scab," a "lackey of imperialism" and of the Kuomintang, guilty of "innumerable crimes."

The Committee dismissed him from the party and all his posts. What happened after that? Silence. The author, inquiring about him in Peking in April 1971 was told that he was still alive but being "re-educated"—an ominous word.

On April 1, 1969, Mao called the long-delayed Ninth National Party Congress into session to review the state of China. The party's politico-military leaders had earlier organized and gained control of most of the nation's 29 provincial, regional and municipal revolutionary committees. They thus were in positions of great strength. Only a month before the opening they had emerged with credit from a serious battle with Russian forces on the Manchurian-Siberian border.

The Congress re-elected Mao chairman and Lin deputy chairman. It adopted an unprecedented party constitution which made Lin Mao's legal successor; his battle, it appeared, had been won.

Then the 1,500 delegates confirmed the sentence on

Liu, heaping new abuse on his head, and turned to the election of the five-man standing committee of the Politbureau, the most powerful body in China. Mao and Lin occupied the first two chairs, Premier Chou the third, Chen Po-ta the next, and a veteran party man, Kang Sheng, the fifth.

The Army's New Power

The 25-man Politbureau itself reflected the army's new power. Twelve of them were associated with the military, in one way or another. Lin Piao could count unreservedly on six, including the army chief of staff, Huang Yung-sheng. Chiang Ching, the woman who had promised to stay out of politics, took a seat in the elite ruling group along with Lin Piao's wife, Yeh Chun.

Whether Mao intended to carry out so sweeping a purge of his country may never be known. He had always believed in the principle of "permanent revolution," that is, periodic challenges to the thinking and habits of the Chinese. They were spring house-cleanings of the mind, reaching into every corner to remove the dust of apathy and sloth.

But in the end, had Mao won? It depended on how you looked at it. He had indeed shaken up China and made it take another look at itself. He had poured adrenalin into the sluggish Chinese bloodstream. And he had, to some extent—at what cost—reformed the party, the intellectuals, the culture and the bureaucracy. They knew they had been in a fight. But would the reforms stick?

His own image, blown up out of all proportion by Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta, had begun to shrink. He was no longer a name at the end of a long string of superlatives. There was only one word now: "Great." It seemed puny by comparison with the adjectives of yesterday. Many of his pictures, statues and quotations had been taken down. He seemed more than ever what he had been in the Yenan days—the first among equals.

Something, too, had happened to his bosom companions of the Cultural Revolution, Lin and Chen. In the months after the party congress, first Chen had disappeared, behind a misty cloud of obscure accusations widely rumored but not confirmed. Then in September 1971, mysterious events happened: the Oct. 1 National

Day parade was cancelled; a planeload of Chinese crashed in Mongolia; the usual Oct. 1 official editorial was scrapped, Mao's picture and that of Lin were absent from the newspapers. Gradually, and without any evidence to back it, the story seeped out: Lin had turned on Mao for permitting the change in policy towards the West and the United States, and had plotted to kill him. Fleeing, he and Yeh Chun had died in the Mongolian plane crash. But another version said Lin had been made the scapegoat for deifying Mao, against the precepts of Marxism, for his own aggrandizement. By mid-January 1972 there still was no official explanation.

It was no mystery, however, that the Cultural Revolution had not turned out precisely as Mao intended.

The "liberalism" against which he had railed in 1966 was a fact of life in 1972. Not only had friendly overtures been made to the "reactionaries" and "revisionists," but Peking itself had laid out the welcome mat for the chief-tain of all imperialism himself, Richard M. Nixon.

Finally, Mao's dictum that it was the party which commanded the gun and not vice versa, had been violated. All his life he had tried to keep civilians in control of the armed forces. Now the army spoke with the loudest voice of all in the highest councils of the party.

The old divisions continued: the leftists led by Lin Piao, cherished the old Long March guerrilla spirit and wanted to go it alone; the professional soldiers, led by Yeh Chien-ying, believed more in weapons and training



Dr. Henry Kissinger, special assistant to President Nixon, takes a tour of China's Great Wall in July 1971 with his Chinese hosts and members of his official group.

than mere evangelism. Lin's passing could perhaps be explained as the consequence of a dispute between these two factions over the rapprochement with the United States. The continued absence of Lin's men, among them Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, suggested that Lin had lost.

Yeh Chien-ying

Square-shouldered, fun-loving and handsome in a masculine way, Yeh more and more occupied center stage during 1971 and 1972. A vice chairman of the powerful Military Commission of the party, member of the Politbureau, and one of the legendary "old guard," he enjoyed the trust both of Mao and Chou. He had been Chou's drinking companion over the years, cut a swathe in Moscow's meager social life as a youth, and besides being a soldier had been drawn to the stage. He won Mao's good will by backing him in his quarrel with Chang Kuo-tao during the Long March over where to locate the



Chou En-lai, 1970.

new Red base. And when Chou fell ill in Hong Kong in the 1920s, he looked after him.

It seemed more than coincidental, then, that Yeh was the army man who met Henry Kissinger on both his trips and sat in on the talks with Chou. At 74, he is the link between the army and Chou, its chosen instrument in the new policy of flexibility toward the outside world.

At 73, Chou is China's indispensable man. When I met him in Peking on April 14, 1971, he seemed a shade grayer and the lines of his face were deeper, but he had all the old bounce and vivacity of 23 years before.

Smiling warmly under the thick eyebrows which look as though they have been applied with a broad painter's brush, he seems like a friendly tiger still able to bite.

One of the most extraordinary men of the century, he is brilliant as an administrator, a superb diplomat and a strikingly attractive human. His talk is lively, interspersed with Chinese proverbs and biting wit, and his manner relaxed and informal. Yet he seems to have the energy of a tightly coiled spring. He walks quickly, gestures frequently, and moves his eyes about with restless curiosity. He speaks English, French, Russian, and some German and Japanese but talks through interpreters in Chinese, occasionally correcting their mistakes.

Seemingly tireless, he sleeps little and works much. He and his wife live an unostentatious and apparently contented home life in the western part of Peking. They have no children.

Chou recognizes that China still is poor and backward, hardly a great power economically. The per capita income is slightly more than \$100 compared to \$1,350 for Japan. Though famine, many endemic diseases, and financial chaos have been eliminated, there is a long way to go.

He is aware that the rest of the world is not standing still. It is the age of the laser beam, the computer, the space shuttle ship, and of electronics. If China is to survive and feed its exploding population, it must break out of the Great Wall of the spirit which has kept it isolated for so many years. This, then, is one of the reasons for China's rapprochement with the United States.

The door so long shut is now ajar. The still unanswered question: When will it swing wide open?

Some Quotes from Chairman Mao



"A well-disciplined party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a party—these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy."

"The enemy will not perish of himself. Neither the Chinese reactionaries nor the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism in China will step down from the stage of history of their own accord."

"A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it can not be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another."

"We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports."

"After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately against us, and we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit the gravest mistakes."

"We Communists never conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum program is to carry China forward to socialism and communism. Both the name of our party and our Marxist world outlook unequivocally point to this supreme ideal of the future, a future of incomparable brightness and splendor."

"The only way to settle questions of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the people is by the democratic method, the method of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education, and not by the method of coercion or repression."

"War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups, and it has existed ever since the emergence of private property and of classes."

"War is the continuation of politics. In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. . . . But war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense it cannot be equated with politics in general. War is the continuation of politics by other . . . means. When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. . . . When the obstacle is removed and our political aim attained, the war will stop. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue till the aim is fully accomplished. . . . It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."

"Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'"

"The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries."

"We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war, but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun."

"All men must die, but death can vary in its significance. The ancient Chinese writer Szuma Chien said, 'Though death befalls all men alike, it may be weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather.' To die for the people is weightier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and the oppressors is lighter than a feather."

"Be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty to win victory."

"We must affirm anew the discipline of the party, namely: (1) the individual is subordinate to the organization; (2) the minority is subordinate to the majority; (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and (4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee. Whoever violates these articles of discipline disrupts party unity."

"The Communist party does not fear criticism because we are Marxists, the truth is on our side, and the basic masses, the workers and the masses, are on our side."

"Communists should be the most far-sighted, the most self-sacrificing, the most resolute, and the least prejudiced in sizing up situations, and should rely on the majority of the masses and win their support."

"The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at 8 or 9 in the morning. Our hope is placed on you. . . . The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you."

"In order to build a great socialist society, it is of the utmost importance to arouse the broad masses of women to join in productive activity. Men and women must re-

ceive equal pay for equal work in production. Genuine equality between the sexes can only be realized in the process of the socialist transformation of society as a whole."

"All our literature and art are for the masses of the people, and in the first place for the workers, peasants and soldiers; they are created for the workers, peasants and soldiers and are for their use."

"Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting the progress of the arts and the sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. Different forms and styles in art should develop freely and different schools in science should contend freely. We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in these fields. They should not be settled in summary fashion."

"All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful."

"I have said that all the reputedly powerful reactionaries are merely paper tigers. The reason is that they are divorced from the people. Look! Was not Hitler a paper tiger? Was Hitler not overthrown? I also said that the czar of Russia, the emperor of China and Japanese imperialism were all paper tigers. As we know, they were all overthrown. U.S. imperialism has not yet been overthrown and it has the atom bomb. I believe it also will be overthrown. It, too, is a paper tiger."

"Over a long period we have developed this concept for the struggle against the enemy: strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously."

"It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, 'Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind.' I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism."

"People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs! People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed."

"The people in the countries of the so-called socialist camp should unite, the people of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite, the people of all the continents should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, and all countries subjected to U.S. aggression, control, intervention or bullying should unite, and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace."

"Our army has always had two policies. First, we must be ruthless to our enemies, we must overpower and annihilate them. Second, we must be kind to our own, to the people, to our comrades and to our superiors and subordinates, and unite with them."

"The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible."

"Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the army."

"The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history."

QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG



FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
PEKING, 1967

tainly learn more about Marxism in the course of the rectification movement.

Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work (March 12, 1957), in pocket ed., p. 14.

It is an arduous task to ensure a better life for the several hundred million people of China and to build our economically and culturally backward country into a prosperous and powerful one with a high level of culture. And it is precisely in order to be able to shoulder this task more competently and work better together with all Party people who are actuated by high ideals and determined to institute reforms we must conduct rectification movements both now and in the future, and completely rid ourselves of whatever is wrong.

Ibid., pp. 15-16.

Policy is the starting-point of all the actions of a revolutionary party. It manifests itself in the process and the result of that party's actions. A revolutionary party is carrying out a policy

style of work to the style of work which integrating theory with practice links with the masses criticism.

Coalition Government" (24, 1945), Selected Works, III, p. 314.

ty can possibly lead a movement to victory revolutionary theory and theory and has a profound political movement.

Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National (October 1958), Selected Works, Vol II, p. 208.

to say, the rectification widespread movement of "Rectification means studying Marxism through criticism. We can cer-

Political Personalities

Since 1965, the Chinese political scene has been marked by great flux. It is no longer possible to say with confidence how long any individual leader will remain in power. The biographies which follow are those of men and women still highly visible early in 1972 and close to the center of power.

MAO TSE-TUNG

Known by all Chinese as "Mao chu-hsi," "Chairman Mao," the head of the Chinese Communist party was born on Dec. 26, 1893, in Shaoshan village, Hunan Province, son of a peasant father and an illiterate mother. He left school at age 13 to work on the family farm at the insistence of his father, whom he hated. Three years later he resumed his studies, organized a political study group called Hsin-min Hsueh-hui (New People's Study Group), and met Liu Shao-chi, a fellow Hunanese. After Hunan Provincial First Normal School he went to Peking to work as an assistant in the Peking University library. He met Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu, noted leftist professors, and Yang Kai-hui, the daughter of another, whom he married.

On July 1, 1921, he joined with Li, Chen and nine others in forming the Chinese Communist party.

For the next six years he organized labor unions, directed a general strike in his native Hunan and became a member of the party Politbureau. In 1927 he made a famous report on the peasant movement in Hunan which laid down his belief the peasants, not the proletariat, would lead the Chinese revolution.



Following Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists, he organized Soviet-style governments in the border regions of Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangsi provinces, created with Chu Teh the beginnings of the Red Army. He became chairman of the "Soviet Republic" in Kiangsi, but suffered a setback when the young Moscow-trained Communists arrived there from Shanghai.

During the 6,000-mile Long March retreat to Shensi in December 1935, he gained control of the party in a conference at Tsunyi in Kweichow. From Yenan, he rebuilt the shattered Communist fortunes, brought about a united front with Chiang Kai-shek and ended World War II in control of 90 million people and a third of China.

In 1949, the victor in the

civil war with the Nationalists, he proclaimed the People's Republic of China; a year later he had become embroiled in war with the United States in Korea.

Having given land to the peasants and forced them into cooperatives, he took it away in 1958 and poured them into rural people's communes, self-sufficient units governing themselves. This was part of a vast effort to plunge China into communism and industrialization overnight called the

Great Leap Forward. It failed, created divisions in the party and alienated the Soviet comrades. Ousted as president in 1959, he returned in 1966 to lead the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which crushed the "old guard" aligned against him. Though he had undertaken the purge to keep China from going liberal, the outcome—thanks to Chou En-lai and the army—was a more flexible foreign policy and more relaxation at home.

CHOU EN-LAI

CHOU EN-LAI has been premier since 1949 and a member of the Standing Committee of the party Politbureau. With the unexplained disappearance of Lin Piao, he appeared to be No. 2 in China and, in fact, the man responsible for its day-to-day life. He was widely believed responsible, along with moderate elements in the army, for the Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-72.

Born in 1898 in Shaohsing, Chekiang, he studied the Chinese classics, entered the American-supported Nankai Middle School in Tientsin and on graduation went to Japan where he attended Waseda University. Returning to Tientsin, he studied at Nankai University, also missionary-backed, and met Teng Ying-chao, later to be his wife. Jailed for his part in the May 4, 1919, demonstrations against the Versailles Conference decision to give Shantung to Japan, he went to France



where he organized a branch of the Communist party in 1921. After travels in Belgium and Germany, he returned to China and became director of the training program of the Political Training Department of the Revolutionary Army.

On the Northern Expedition he organized three workers' uprisings in Shanghai, clearing the way for the entry of the national revolutionary army without a battle. Fleeing after Chiang Kai-shek's purge of the Communists, he went to Hankow, became a member of the Politbureau in April 1927,

directed an unsuccessful insurrection in Nanchang and escaped to Hong Kong. From there he attended the party's Sixth Congress in Moscow, became director of the Organization Department of the party, confessed his past mistakes and retained his posts. He was political commissar on the Long March, voted for Mao at the Tsunyi Conference in 1935 and never seriously challenged him thereafter.

In 1936, he negotiated the united front agreement with Chiang Kai-shek at Sian and subsequently played a leading part as negotiator in U.S. Gen. George C. Marshall's efforts to establish a postwar coalition.

A master diplomat, he was active at the 1954 Indochina conference in Geneva, dominated the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung and

scored considerable successes in Asian, East European, Russian and African tours, the latter in 1963-64. He is China's most widely-traveled official. In 1958 he relinquished the post of foreign minister, which he had held concurrently with the premiership since 1949, to his protégé, Chen Yi.

Moderator and Mao's "chief of staff" during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, he helped damp down the worst excesses of this nationwide purge. In 1971, he received first a U.S. table tennis team and American correspondents, then successive visits by three U.S. presidential parties, the first two headed by President Nixon's chief for security affairs, Henry Kissinger. He announced on July 15, 1971, Nixon's visit to Peking. He has no known children.

LIN PIAO

Deputy chairman of the Communist party and regarded as Mao's legal heir, Lin Piao disappeared in late 1971 amidst wild rumors, one of them that he attempted a coup against Mao because of the new policy of detente, particularly toward the United States. It was said, without confirmation, that he died in a plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971.

Shy and unassuming, Lin was China's most brilliant military man, the conqueror of Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war and the brains behind the Chinese drive into North Korea against U.S. troops.

Born in 1907 in Hupeh



Province, he left home at the age of 10, joined the Socialist Youth League in Shanghai, graduated from the new revolutionary Whampoa Military Academy at the age of 19 and joined the party when he was 20. His military rise was extra-

ordinary in the next few years. At 25 he commanded the Red Army's 1st Army Group which broke through the Nationalist encirclement and spearheaded the Long March. Seriously wounded after a series of important victories over Japanese forces, he went to Moscow for treatment, and was said to have taken part in the defense of Leningrad. Sent to Manchuria in 1947, he organized an army which by 1948 had grown to 800,000 men; it captured Mukden and sent Chiang's forces reeling.

After serving in a number of important commands, he became a member of the Polit-

bureau in 1950, succeeded the cashiered Peng Teh-huai as defense minister in 1959, and thanks to his campaign to raise Mao to divine Marxist rank, was rewarded by being named his "closest comrade-in-arms" in August 1966. He already had become deputy chairman and took the lead, along with Madame Mao, in encouraging the extreme leftists in the Cultural Revolution. The Ninth Party Congress in 1969 officially designated him Mao's successor. His wife was Yeh Chun, daughter of New Fourth Army Commander Yeh Ting. She became a Politbureau member in 1969.

CHIANG CHING

CHIANG CHING, Madame Mao Tse-tung, is the fourth wife of the party chairman and her third husband. Her early days are somewhat obscure, as is the date of her birth, listed as 1914 by one biographer and between 1910-1915 by another. Her original name was Luan Shu-meng. She became Li Ching-yun when a grandfather adopted her, Lan Ping when she became an actress and Chiang Ching as Madame Mao. Her childhood in Shantung Province was poverty-stricken and she didn't go beyond junior middle school. One version says she worked as a clerk in the Tsinan public library and read Henrik Ibsen's "A Doll's House," admiring the role of Nora and yearning to play this part of the resolutely modern and emancipated woman on stage. Another biographer says she



was kidnapped and sold to a Tsinan theatrical troupe. Unchallenged is the fact she married Yu Chi-wei, a nephew of the later Nationalist defense minister, Yu Ta-wei, who became a Communist, and died in 1958.

Going to Shanghai, she is said to have played Nora at last. She had quit Tsingtao after being jailed for membership in a Communist front organization. In Shanghai she

played with a left-wing motion picture company. Divorced, she married the critic Tan Na in a widely advertised civil wedding along with three other movie couples, in Hangchow in 1935.

Off to the wartime capital of Chungking in 1938, she set out for Sian and Yanan where she met Kang Sheng and entered the Lu Hsun Art Academy. She met Mao for the first time when he gave a talk there, became his mistress in 1940 and married him soon after.

Until the Cultural Revolution, she interested herself

chiefly in Communist movie activities. She assisted Tao Wen-yuan in preparing the criticism of Wu Han's play, "Hai Jui Dismissed From Office," which touched off the cultural purge. She became first deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee and adviser to the Liberation Army. She was elected to the Politbureau by the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. Her daughters are Mao Mao and Hsiao Li, formerly known as Li Na or Li No.

KANG SHENG

KANG SHENG'S name was Chao Jung when he was born in 1903 in Shantung Province and he came from a big landlord family. The most important thing in his life, perhaps, was that he befriended Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's future wife, when she arrived in Yanan in 1939. He got her into the Yushun Art Academy, backed her marriage to Mao against party opposition and sponsored her membership in the party. His reward was fulsome: in 1971 he was a member of the five-man standing committee of the Politbureau whose other members were Mao, Lin Biao, Chou En-lai, and Chen Po-ta.

In his early Communist days he was the political security chief, an intelligence agent. He plotted uprisings against the government in Shanghai, and had to flee. He studied in the Soviet Union, became principal of the Communist party school in Yanan, rose to



the Politbureau, became an intelligence chief again, and urged the peasants and workers to write articles and books. Though not much older than his associates, they always called him "Lao Kang." "Old Kang." In 1972, like Lin, Chen Po-ta and many other "leftists" of the Cultural Revolution, he was seldom seen in public. Illness, however, may have been the reason. He set a wreath at the funeral services for Foreign Minister Chen Yi on Jan. 8, 1972.

CHEN PO-TA

Born in Huian county, Fukien Province in 1904, Chen Po-ta attended the Labor University in Shanghai, became personal secretary to a Communist general, spent two years in a Kuomintang jail, studied at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and became interested in Marxist theory in 1931. He worked underground for the party while teaching under the name of Chen Chih-mei, as a professor at China College. He continued to write under his real name. When his students discovered that he was Chen Po-ta, the brilliant writer, they could not believe that he was also their shy, bumbling teacher.

In Yanan, he became a lecturer in the party school, but

YEH CHIEN-YING

Ruggedly handsome, a member of the party Politbureau, vice-chairman of the prestigious party Military Commission, Yeh Chien-ying has the confidence both of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Increasingly, he occupies the forefront in post-Cultural Revolution China. In 1971, he was with Chou at the airport to meet Henry Kissinger on both his trips, sat in on the talks and apparently represents the moderate wing of the army which is encouraging the U.S.-China detente.

Born in 1899 in Kwangtung Province, he spent part of his childhood in Singapore and Hanoi, graduated from the Yunnan Military Institute, became Sun Yat-sen's secretary, and joined the party in 1924

more importantly joined Mao as his political secretary. It was he who is believed to have "ghost written" many of his speeches, as well as editorials in the important party organs. The leading party theoretician, he became editor-in-chief of Hung Chi (Red Flag), the party's theoretical journal in 1958 and a professor at Peking University the same year.

A quiet, serious individual, he neither drinks nor smokes. He is the author of many works on Chinese and Soviet communism, led the campaign to glorify Mao, and was chairman of the Cultural Revolutionary Committee in which Chiang Ching served. In 1972 he was believed to have been purged, possibly for having incited the Mao deification drive.

Chief of staff of the First Army on the Northern Expedition, he later rose to divisional command. He helped plan the Communist Nanchang Uprising, fled to Hong Kong where he nursed the ill Chou En-lai, then returned to Canton to stage an uprising there, all in 1927. In Moscow he studied military tactics, traveled to Germany and Paris, then spent a year studying drama. Becoming principal of the Red Army College in the Kiangsi Soviet, he organized a dramatic troupe in 1931, drafted the military plan for the Long March, had time to organize a drama troupe in the retreating First Column which propagandized the war against Japan. He backed Mao in his dispute with Chang Kuo-tao over where to establish the Red base and

helped plan the 1936 kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek in collaboration with Chang Hsueh-liang. He infiltrated Communists into the Kuomintang army and brought about the defection of 16 infantry regiments, for which he got a gold medal, first class, in Yanan in 1945. He went with

Mao to the Chungking talks with Chiang Kai-shek in 1945, became mayor of Peking in 1949, and accompanied Chou to the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in 1969. His wife, Tseng Hsien-chih, is active in women's activities. There are two daughters, Yeh Niu-niu and Yeh Hsiang-chien.

KUO MO-JO

KUO MO-JO confessed at the start of the Cultural Revolution that all his books should be burned, they were valueless. But after this abject self-criticism he was reinstated by Mao, one of his most ardent admirers. A brilliant writer and thinker, he is China's Renaissance man, adept equally in politics, culture, foreign affairs and science.

Born in 1891 in Szechuan Province, he is two years older than Mao, an additional reason for gaining his respect. His early studies were in Japan, where he fell in love with a Japanese girl he could not marry because his parents had already arranged a marriage for him. He immersed himself in Indian poetry, Goethe and Spinoza, and began a long period of travel between China and Japan. His translations of Goethe and Nietzsche brought him popular acclaim. In 1924 he announced himself a Marxist-Leninist, continued to translate and create, and in 1927 wrote a devastating attack on Chiang Kai-shek said to have precipitated, in part, the purge of the Communists of that year. Stricken ill, he went again to Japan where he spent the next 10 years, still enor-



mously busy translating, writing and thinking. He joined the party late, in 1949, was named a vice-premier, served on numerous united front committees, became the first president of the Academy of Sciences, received the Stalin Peace Prize, then plunged into politics. He represented Szechuan as a deputy to the People's Congress, became vice-chairman of its standing committee, campaigned against atomic weapons (China had none then), and worked for the popularization of the common spoken language. Now old and full of honors, he once was described by Lu Hsun, China's most famous writer, as "a mixture of genius and rascal." His wife, Yu Li-chun, was active in women's work. He had five sons, the last, Kuo Shih-ying, committed suicide in 1968.

LI HSIEN-NIEN

A carpenter who became a Communist, Li Hsien-nien moved up the ladder in the classic manner, as a political commissar, guerrilla leader, divisional commander, and finally vice-commander of a field army. Born in 1905 in Hupeh Province, he seems to have had little formal schooling, yet became one of the financial and economic lights of Chinese communism. He was minister of finance in 1954 and steered through a dozen trade agreements with other Communist countries. In recent years, especially since the Cultural Revolution, he has com-

bined foreign affairs among his duties as a vice-premier, appearing at functions and performing duties once assigned to Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who died in January 1972. As vice-chairman of the State Planning Commission, he is a key planner of the fourth Five Year Plan. A close friend of Chou En-lai, he is a member of the Politbureau, one of the few vice-premiers to survive the shocks of the cultural purge. His wife, Lin Chia-mei, has been active in the Ministry of Public Health and the Office of Finance and Trade.

YAO WEN-YUAN

The youngest of the members of the new Politbureau, Yao Wen-yuan owes his swift rise to power to the patronage of Chairman and Madame Mao. It was he who in 1965 wrote the vituperative attack on Wu Han's "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office," correctly diagnosed as an attack by the Peking establishment on Mao's dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai in 1959.

His age and details of his early life are obscure though he is said to have been born about 1929. It also is rumored that he is Mao's and Chiang Ching's son-in-law, having married their daughter, Hsiao Li, but this is not confirmed.

Son of a leftist writer of bourgeois background, Yao is believed to have studied in Szechuan and Shanghai. In 1951 he was a leading member of the Shanghai Youth League and began his career of literary criticism for the

Communist-dominated Wen-i Pao (Literature and Art News) and later became an editor of Wen-i Yueh-pao (Literature and Art Monthly). The 1955 campaign against the writer Hu Feng gave him a chance to gain attention and he seized it. He gained prominence subsequently by chopping down writers greater than he. Having earned his spurs through attacks on "revisionists," he became a member of the editorial board of the important Shanghai Liberation Daily. For his criticisms he gained the hatred of many in Chinese literary life, but he did not stop. In 1965 he came to the attention of Mao and Chiang Ching. The success of his attack on Wu Han led to further diatribes against other literary, journalistic and cultural leaders. When Mao staged his widely attended rallies in Peking in 1966, Yao was beside him.

THE BALANCE OF WORLD POWER SHIFTS

Communist China's leaders seem to have conjured up a bad dream for themselves and have concluded that if two foreign devils haunt them the one closer at hand—the Soviet Union—is by far the more ominous.

Peking seems agitated about Soviet intentions as it reads them. This involves something like a huge Soviet noose looped about much of that so-called third world of "medium-sized and small nations" in Asia and Africa for which Peking now claims to speak.

As Red China puts it, the Russians are reverting to type, acting like the czars of old trying to establish "a world empire." Peking insists that Soviet activity in the Asian subcontinent is connected with a scheme to build



"a sealane arch" that would extend from the Mediterranean and Black Seas in a southward-dropping semi-circle through the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, around Southeast Asia and up to the Sea of Japan.

That, said a recent article carried by the official Red Chinese news agency, is why Moscow was so deeply involved in arms aid to India and why the Soviet fleet had shown the flag all along the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

The Soviet-Chinese feuding seemed a far cry from October 1949, when the victorious Mao Tse-tung established the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union announced that the friendship between Moscow and Peking would be "eternal and unbreakable." Yet the Russian-Chinese break should not have been much of a surprise. It would, in fact, have been surprising if such an alliance had withstood the test of time. The differences

between the two went deep. Ideology was simply an added ingredient, a thin outer crust of a quarrel that involved territorial, military and economic questions.

The how and why of these developments go back into the mists of history.

The Chinese Communists themselves have dated their territorial differences with the Russians all the way back to the 17th century when Russian pioneers ran afoul of the Manchus' Ch'ing dynasty along the Amur, called by the Chinese "River of the Black Dragon." Manchu forces drove the Russians from a fort on disputed territory. Thereafter the Ch'ing court, which regarded the Russians as savage barbarians, reached agreement with the intruders on defining the eastern sector of the boundary. What the Chinese called the Treaty of Nipchu and the Russians the Treaty of Nerchinsk was the first pact in history between the Chinese Empire and a European power.

The treaty left the Maritime Province in the far east in Chinese hands. The Russians and Chinese later agreed, in the Burinsky Treaty, on defining the middle sector of the Sino-Russian frontier in the area of Mongolia.

The Russian Empire had a voracious appetite. It lost no opportunity to take advantage of China's weakness, particularly after the Opium War when the Ch'ing court was at its weakest. In mid-century, while the Ch'ing government desperately tried to cope with the widespread Taiping Rebellion and an invasion by French and British military forces, the Russians laid claim to the Manchus' Maritime Province. By the treaties of Aigun and Peking, the Chinese by 1860 had been obliged to cede a total of about 600,000 square miles, an area almost thrice the size of France.

The western sector of the Sino-Russian frontier was destined to be a frequent flashpoint of political and sometimes military conflict. Sinkiang, a vast province two-and-a-half times the size of Texas, much of it barren desert locked by mountains but possessing enormous potential wealth in minerals, was eyed greedily by the Russian czar. After the successful revolt of a local chieftain named Yakub Bey, who ruled Sinkiang as an independent nation for about 10 years, the czar in 1871 sent

Russian troops to the Ili area of Sinkiang, ostensibly as a neighborly gesture to help the Manchus reconquer the area. But the Russians stayed on and on in occupation, on the pretext of preventing disorders from spreading into the czar's own Central Asian realm which Russia had taken over not long before. The Russian troops stayed a full 10 years and the czar, by applying superior military power, forced the Ch'ings to accept the Ili Treaty of 1881 ceding about 45,000 additional square miles to Russia.

Today, the Chinese Communists never tire of lecturing the Russian Communists about the promises of Lenin's Bolshevik regime and about how, time after time, Marx, Engels and other luminaries of the Communist pantheon had denounced czarist treaties with China. Lenin called the treaties "criminal aggression" and he promised that Russia under the Bolsheviks would surely reverse matters and give back stolen land.

Nothing much was done about it however, even though a few months after Lenin's death, the Russians and Sun Yat-sen's struggling Chinese Republic signed a treaty supposedly annulling all previous agreements made between China and czarist governments, pending redefinition of all boundaries.

Stalin, however, industriously nailed down Moscow's hold in all territories, determined to keep every square inch. More than that, he imposed Russian influence in Outer Mongolia and made it a satellite "people's republic," intent upon expelling Chinese influence there.

In more recent years, in the western areas of China's territories, the Russians directed venomous propaganda campaigns against the Han rulers of Sinkiang, evidently trying to persuade the indigenous Uighurs, Kazakhs and others to revolt. This became all the more aggravating to Peking after Sinkiang became the center of Chinese nuclear weapons installations. Elsewhere along the 4,000 miles of Sino-Soviet frontier in the 1960s there were sporadic clashes, resulting by 1969 in sharp battles in disputed Far East areas along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.

Other factors contributing to the feud:

After the Bolsheviks took over the Russian revolution and entrenched themselves, they sent top Communist International (Comintern) agents to China to advise Sun Yat-sen's republican revolution that had overthrown the Manchus in 1912. The Russian aim was to subject Sun's movement to Communist influence and control. When the Chinese Communist party was founded in 1921, the Comintern ordered it to cooperate with Sun's Kuomintang. The objective was an eventual takeover of the poorly organized Kuomintang party by occupation of key posts in it.

But elements of the Chinese party resented Moscow's constant meddling and this anger deepened after Chiang Kai-shek staged a lightning bloody purge in 1927, wiping out much of the Communist leadership. This period, marked by a break in Chiang's relations with

Moscow, would prove the first stage of a process of reshaping the Chinese Communist party.

Stalin would have welcomed the idea of a Communist-dominated China, but he neither liked nor trusted Mao. In messages hand-carried to the Chinese Reds, Stalin made it clear that he felt the time was not ripe for a takeover, but Mao did not worship at the Kremlin temple. By October 1949, Mao's forces had swept Chiang's out of the mainland.

At 56, Mao left Chinese territory for the first time in his life, to go to Moscow, seeking economic and military help from a brother Communist nation. He remained two months in Moscow and there must have been tough horse-trading. But in the end all China got out of it was a "friendship" treaty, the equivalent of \$300 million as a loan plus some technical training arrangements. It seemed extremely niggardly from a partner in what even then was hailed as the "eternal and unbreakable friendship."

Still, in the United States as in much of the West, the assumption seemed to be that China added a vast area and population to a monolithic Communist conspiracy which would be directed from Moscow.

Even in those days, however, there were vague signs of strain, and over the next half dozen or so years the strains began to surface slowly.

Mao seemed to have been severely shaken by the 1956 revolution in Hungary against Communist rule. Frequently thereafter he would refer to it as evidence of the blundering of Stalin's heirs under Nikita Khrushchev, of the perfidy of intellectuals and of the unwisdom of the relaxation suggested by a Soviet de-Stalinization that had only just begun. It appeared that Mao feared something like a Hungarian uprising could happen in China, too.

For their part, the Russians were, in return, showing signs of irritation with Peking. The signs became fairly clear after 1958 and Mao's promulgation of the Great Leap Forward campaign of economic development intended as a shortcut to "communism." From Moscow's viewpoint it was the rankest of heresy. Khrushchev scoffed angrily.

The Leap proved a disastrous fiasco, but it was not the only reason for Moscow's ire. Khrushchev later would make known his suspicion that Mao represented an acute danger to world peace—and, perhaps more important, to Soviet security.

In any case, the Russians showed no enthusiasm whatever for a nuclear-armed China and began to shy away from helping the Chinese along such lines. For his part, Mao reflected vast annoyance with Khrushchev, not only for the lack of help in the nuclear weapons field but also because Khrushchev had visited America and labelled President Eisenhower "a good man." For Mao at that time, there could have been no greater heresy.

The quarrel moved more clearly into world view in 1960 when international Communist meetings in Bucha-

rest and Moscow produced clear evidence of a developing feud. By this time, ideology was only one aspect of the quarrel. The Chinese also were bitter about such things as the meanness of Soviet economic and military help, the territorial questions and the lack of Soviet encouragement for China's nuclear ambitions.

Chou En-lai later was authority for the charge that Khrushchev in 1960 "abruptly and perfidiously tore up several hundred agreements and contracts, withdrew Soviet experts working in China and cut off the supply of important items of equipment, thus seriously upsetting our original plan for national economic development and adding greatly to our difficulties." China, too, did some tearing up. It nullified an agreement calling for delivery of rare metals, mined in Sinkiang, to the Soviet Union.

The quarrel deepened and relations fell to new low levels in 1965. The Kremlin enraged Peking by calling a meeting of the 26 Communist parties which had drafted the 1960 Moscow declaration, a blueprint of the international movement's strategy and tactics. The object of the new meeting was to put Peking in its place, but it fizzled, mainly because some of the invited parties stayed away. To Peking, the Moscow meeting proved that "the modern revisionists have made Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence a figleaf to cover their capitulation to U.S. imperialism and the peaceful evolution to capitalism which they practice in their own countries."

Later the same year a Chinese-backed attempt to mount a coup in Indonesia backfired, producing a bloodbath that wiped out much of the Indonesian party. Moscow held Chinese adventuring to blame and the language exchanged between the Russians and Chinese became daily more violent.

The explosion that went by the name of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution brought Moscow-Peking relations between 1966 and 1969 to an all-time low mark. Red Guards, obviously with official blessing, gleefully harassed Soviet diplomatic officials and proclaimed lasting Chinese hatred for the Russian "modern revisionists." A big-character poster plastered on the fence of the Soviet Embassy proclaimed that some day "we shall cut the skin off you, we shall tear out your guts, we shall burn your corpses and disperse your ashes to the winds."

To Peking, Moscow's regime now represented "Enemy No. 1." To Moscow, Mao's regime could not claim to be socialist or Communist or anything but a military dictatorship based on fear and repression. In

April 1969, in fact, Moscow broadcast a tabulation of what it called "bestial slaughter" by the Mao regime since 1949. Altogether in its 20 years, said Moscow, the Peking regime killed more than 26 million persons.

After brief military skirmishes in border areas early in 1969, the relations of the two Communist giants hung by a thread, and then late in the year came the most serious military clash of all in a disputed Far East boundary area. Premier Kosygin stopped off in Peking to talk with Premier Chou. He was received by Chou at the airport and there the two talked. The result: there would be Soviet-Chinese border negotiations. Those negotiations proceeded soon afterward and month after month got nowhere. Meanwhile, the volume of Soviet-Chinese trade, by Moscow account, stood at its all-time low point, by 1970 representing only 5 per cent of what it had been a dozen years before.

When China beamed signals toward the United States in what became known in 1971 as "Ping-Pong diplomacy," the Russians mounted a barrage of anti-Chinese propaganda accusing Peking of plotting to collaborate with the Americans against world Communist interests. The Chinese all along had accused the Russians of colluding with the United States against China.

The Soviet Union supported Red China's entry into the United Nations, but it had little choice, with the rest of the world looking on. In the United Nations it quickly became clear that China's hostility would make itself amply manifest. In one of their first clashes, the Russians aimed some poisonous barbs at the Chinese who, in turn, responded with the most exquisite insult in Communist jargon. They called the Russian representative "mister."

Once again in the 1970s, as before, it seemed plain that the Soviet Union would be guided in its world policies by its national interests rather than ideology. It was national big-power interests that sent Soviet ships roaming the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to fling challenge at the West.

Crisis in the Asian subcontinent, sparking war between India and Pakistan, found China and Russia supporting opposite sides for reasons that had nothing to do with ideology. Peking backed an extreme right wing regime in Pakistan; Moscow aided a professedly democratic government in India which had experienced Chinese military pressure on her borders. In some quarters, all this revived talk that war between China and Russia had to happen some day.

Whatever might happen, it was clear that with China in the United Nations, a new stage in world relationships had begun. China's debut as a nuclear nation and the approaches between Peking and Washington meant that the world had become multipolar in terms of balance of power.

As one commentator speculated, the new look of the "China factor" in world relations might one day "push the United States and the Soviet Union toward sanity."

A NEW INTEREST IN THE UNITED NATIONS

As a founding member of the League of Nations and a major Allied power in World War II, it seemed inevitable that China would play a leading role in the creation of the United Nations and eventually in the operations of the new organization.

Long before the end of the war, in fact, China became involved in discussions which laid the foundation for the United Nations. It was a signatory of the Moscow Declaration on General Security of Oct. 30, 1943, calling for the establishment of a "general international organization" at the earliest practicable date. It also was an active participant in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, the Bretton Woods conference and other meetings aimed at the establishment of post-war international organizations.

Thus it came about naturally that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek joined Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin as sponsors of the San Francisco conference in 1945 and that China emerged as one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council when the charter was finally approved. When the new world organization came into being, China took its place as the predominant nation of Asia. Its future in the United Nations seemed secure.

However, by the end of 1949, just four years after the birth of the United Nations, Chiang and his Nationalist armies had been swept from the mainland to Taiwan. The world organization found itself faced with a controversy over Chinese representation which was to continue for 22 years, while Chiang's representatives clung to their U.N. seats, watched their influence diminish and suffered innumerable snubs and indignities.

The so-called China question first came to the United Nations on Nov. 18, 1949, in the form of a cable from Chou En-lai, foreign minister of the new People's Republic of China, declaring that the Nationalist delegation had no right to speak for the Chinese people. This was the first of a series of developments which escalated over the next few months into a major U.N. crisis.

Soviet Ambassador Jacob A. Malik threw his support behind the Chinese Communists with a declaration that his delegation would not recognize the Nationalists as representatives of China. Chou sent a second cable to members of the Security Council demanding the expul-

sion of the "Kuomintang" group. Malik announced that the Soviet Union would boycott the council unless Peking was seated. But the council rejected a Soviet resolution calling for the replacement of the Nationalists by Peking representatives. The vote—six against, three in favor and two abstaining—triggered a chain of Soviet walkouts, beginning with the council itself and spreading to one U.N. organ after another until it became almost a total boycott.

It was during this boycott, incidentally, that North Korean troops attacked South Korea across the 38th Parallel and the council voted to create a U.N. military command with the goal of repelling the attackers. It is generally agreed that the Soviet Union would have invoked the veto to block the U.N. intervention if it had not been boycotting the council.

Malik returned to the council a month after the start of the Korean war and the Soviet boycott of other U.N. organs also was ended. As president of the council, Malik ruled that the Nationalist delegation could not sit at the table. His ruling was reversed, however, by a vote of 8-3 with only India and Yugoslavia joining him in opposing the challenge. The council later rejected a Soviet proposal to formally take up the question of "recognition of the representatives of the People's Republic of China."

As early as March 1950, U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie had become personally involved in the controversy by circulating a legal memorandum, declaring that where two governments contend for the same seat "the question at issue should be which of the two governments in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the state in fulfillment of the obligations of membership." He argued that an inquiry should be made as to "whether the new government exercises effective authority within the territory of the state and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population." If the answer was in the affirmative, he said, the government should be given the right to represent China.

Although the initial battleground was the Security Council, the Chinese representation question shifted to the General Assembly in the fall of 1950. The assembly had not sought to preempt the right of the council to decide upon its own membership, but it assumed the responsibility of laying down guidelines.

Beginning with the 1951 session, the Chinese representation question returned each year to plague the assembly. Only in 1964 was there no vote—because of a voting crisis which caused the assembly to shelve all controversial issues. The voting on China was close only in 1965, when it was tied 47-47 with 20 abstaining, and in 1970, when Peking finally gained a 51-49 majority. In each case, however, the assembly had decided in advance that a two-thirds vote was needed.

Each year from 1951 through 1960, the United States led a parliamentary fight to postpone action and thus to prevent the issue from coming to a decisive vote. Beginning in 1961, the vote was on the question of expelling Nationalist China and seating Peking.

A peculiar facet in the battle over the Chinese seat was the fact that the Peking government made little effort on its own behalf after its initial 1949 and 1950 moves. For the most part, it depended entirely on friendly countries to carry the ball. In the beginning, the Soviet Union led the fight. Then it was India. After Red China's attack on India, the lead shifted to Albania. It was only in 1971 that Peking showed any real interest in U.N. membership and began to drop its attacks on the world organization.

By then, an end to the long controversy was in sight. This was due to a number of factors, among them a steady increase in support for Peking among the new Asian and African nations and, even more important, a shift of America's NATO allies away from Washington's anti-Peking stand. It had become clear after the 1970 vote that the United States would not be able to hold the line against Peking much longer.

The clinchers were President Nixon's decision to visit Peking and the U.S. switch to a plan for dual representation under which both Nationalist and Communist Chinese delegations would sit in the United Nations, with Peking taking over China's Security Council seat. Many countries, which had stuck with the United States in the past on the China issue, decided the time had come to look to their own relations with Peking. The main test at the 1971 assembly session was on a U.S.-sponsored resolution which would have invoked the two-thirds rule by declaring the Chinese representation issue an "important question." This was defeated by a vote of 55 in favor, 59 against and 15 abstaining. A few minutes later, the assembly approved the so-called Albanian resolution expelling the Nationalists and seating Peking. Even before the vote, however, the 22-year struggle came to the end for the Nationalists when Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai led his delegation from the blue and gold assembly chamber after a dramatic farewell blast.

"To deny the Republic of China its rightful position in the United Nations," he told a news conference, "is to violate the charter and negate the noble and sacred principles and purposes upon which the United Nations was founded."

"We have been very patient. The U.N. has deteriorated. It is no longer the organization we founded in 1945. It is a circus."

Three weeks after the vote, Peking finally took over the Chinese seat in the assembly. Chinese experts agreed that the delegation was topflight and that its composition evidently reflected a desire to play an active role. At its head was Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, one of Peking's most experienced diplomats. As permanent U.N. representative was round-faced Huang Hua, who had been standing by as ambassador to Canada during the crucial 1971 developments.

Chiao's first speech was an attack on the "superpowers." Although it hit the Soviet Union to some extent, it was aimed mainly at the United States. Chiao demanded that the United States get out of Indochina and withdraw its military support of Taiwan. In comparison with most Peking statements in recent years, it was regarded as moderate in tone. U.S. Ambassador George Bush, nevertheless, issued a White House-approved statement calling it "empty cannons of rhetoric."

What surprised diplomats even more was the exchange which developed during the next few weeks between the Chinese and the Russians. They transferred their ideological conflict to the U.N. meeting rooms and aired their differences before a worldwide audience. The ensuing name-calling match was reminiscent of the worst days of the Cold War.

The Chinese-Soviet battle was carried over from the assembly into the Security Council during the debate on the India-Pakistan war. Here, however, it was the Soviet Union that wielded the veto three times while Peking lined up with the United States and the council majority in pushing for a cease-fire resolution. Whether this carried a significant message for the future was not known, but at least in this one case Peking's presence in the council had made no difference in the outcome. Another possible straw in the wind was the attitude of the Chinese Communists during the voting on a new U.N. secretary-general to succeed U Thant. Many had feared Peking might block action with the veto while holding out for a man of its own choice. After two private test ballots, however, Peking withheld its veto and went along with the majority in choosing Kurt Waldheim of Austria.

It may be many months before the full impact of Peking's presence becomes clear. But it is apparent that the United Nations has gained a new element of interest, uncertainty—and a lot of new faces. More importantly, in the view of diplomats, the most populous country in the world is now represented in the United Nations.

CHINA'S PAST...

Their coasts are washed by the same ocean, but the gulf that divides China and the United States is as vast as the waters of the Pacific. Between those shores one day begins and another ends, only a token of the gap of time between the world's oldest peoples and one of its newest.

China can trace its history back 4,000 years or more; the United States has yet to celebrate its bicentennial. The Chinese, as a people, have lived between great rivers that have flowed across their land to the sea. The Yellow, the Yangtze, the Pearl—symbols of a people's timelessness. America, on the other hand, was formed by rivers of myriad peoples who flooded to her shores. China is a Ming vase, America a melting pot. The Chinese is a farmer, a peasant; the soil and its harvest have been the tap root of his civilization. The American is an artisan, a mechanic—production his god. The American is an individualist—unique and different. The Chinese is a conformist and he regards himself as a mere link in an endless chain of generations.


China, until Mao Tse-tung, revered age and its accumulated wisdom. America venerates youth. Americans are mobile, urban; the Chinese are rooted and rural. Eighty per cent of the Chinese are still farmers, living in villages they have seldom left.

China has suffered innumerable rebellions and foreign invasions, but has never been erased or eclipsed. China to the Chinese is and always has been the cultural and geographical center of the universe. After all, they remind us, it is the place where the sun rises.

The takeover of night by day, the inevitable alternating of weakness and strength, is the pendulum philosophy of Yin and Yang, which is the Chinese view of the world. The concept is basic to the ideas of Lao Tse, or Taoism, one of China's two great philosophies. Yin is female, dark, thin and weak. Yang is red, male, the sun and day. When a person is sick, Yin has taken over. Eventually, Yin is released by a re-emergence of strength—Yang. But the greater Yang grows, the sooner it will once again yield to Yin.

Taoism has been the Yin of Chinese society—a philosophy of protest, when the government had weakened and exacted too much. Confucianism, the teachings of China's great philosopher Confucius, has been the Yang—

Yin



when a dynasty was in the height of its power and strength. The swing from Yin to Yang corresponds to the history of China's dynasties.

The Chinese call themselves the people of Chung-kuo, the Middle Kingdom, the kingdom between heaven and earth. From classical until modern times, the rulers of China have been the Sons of Heaven—the link between heaven and earth. Closer to heaven than any other being, they have been superior because, if nothing else, they have been rulers.

At various times, emperors have stood at the Gate of Heavenly Peace at Tien An Men Square in Peking and interpreted for the people the Will of Heaven. Any man of sufficient initiative, energy, power and wisdom could become a ruler and, as such, receive the Mandate of Heaven. Possessing the Mandate of Heaven, the emperor set up a hereditary dynasty which might last hundreds of years.

Chinese lived beside the Yellow River 7,000 years ago, while man was just beginning to find the fertile shores of the Mediterranean. But even before these early Chinese, anthropologists have determined the existence of another being—Peking Man—who lived some 400,000 years ago. The Chinese have been as concerned about their origins as any people, but no one, not even the Chinese, knows how old China really is.

Chinese family life was synthesized and clarified by Confucius, a scholar-statesman who lived before the Greek philosophers, and 500 years before Christ. He defined five basic relationships—friend to friend, which is equal, and the rest unequal: younger brother to older brother, son to father, wife to husband, and subject to ruler. The state, in essence, was an expanded family.

Confucius lived during the Chou dynasty (1122-256 B.C.), a time when rulers were soldier-statesmen, as they had been in the Shang dynasty which preceded it.

(1766-1122 B.C.) and the Hsia dynasty before that. The legendary first Chinese emperor was Huang-ti, who lived several thousand years before Christ. His rule is credited with the development of silk, a compass and a 365-day calendar. Huang-ti is also known as the Good Emperor because he constructed great public works—roads, granaries, irrigation systems and canals. After Confucius, the ancient feudal system was replaced by a more efficient bureaucratic administration and, when the empire got organized, it developed into what has been called Imperial Confucianism, which has lasted into modern times.

Not much is known of the earlier dynasties because their records were burned by the dynasty that came into power at this time in 221 B.C. It was called Ch'in, and it is from this that we get the name China. The most famous and lasting achievement of the Ch'in dynasty was the Great Wall, 1,400 miles long, running the distance from Kansu in the southwest through the rugged mountains to the southern edge of Inner Mongolia and to southern Manchuria. It was originally designed to protect the agrarian south from nomadic "barbarians" who roamed the steppes in the north and was added on to by subsequent emperors.


The Han dynasty was one of the greatest of Chinese history. It is the language and culture of Han that we mean when we say Chinese. The Han dynasty paralleled the Roman Empire in dates, power, prestige and historical significance. From the west where it met the Roman Empire, the Han dynasty expanded north into Korea and south into Indochina.

The Han dynasty nationalized land and redistributed it; it created government monopolies. The dynasty also required its citizens to spend a month per year building roads and canals, imperial palaces and tombs. Eventually, ever-heavier taxation led to economic disruption and the collapse of the dynasty. Yang had given into Yin.

Following the fall of the Han dynasty, China went through a great period of upheaval. Various would-be dynasties contended for power and the people sought refuge in the passive inactivity of Taoism. Meanwhile, Chinese traders had visited India and returned with small wooden replicas of a god, Buddha. Buddhism was private and individualistic, the antithesis of Confucianism. Buddhism denied the importance of political and social order, or even the desirability of life in this world. In Buddhism there were four truths: that life is painful, that pain comes from desire, that the ending of desire ends pain, and that the end is through right living—the Middle Way. Inner peace through meditation and right living.

Chinese Writing

Written Chinese developed as ideographs or picturegraphs 3,000 years ago during the Shang dynasty. In the beginning, they were scratched on narrow stalks of bamboo, tortoise shells or oxen bones. They were hatch marks, from top to bottom, right to left. Some of the first words were rice, man, woman and peace, and the first thoughts were questions concerning floods and harvests. As time has gone on, some Chinese characters developed intrinsic meanings, and the act of writing calligraphy and its result has an added significance of its own, even today. The placards of Mao's thoughts, for example, are in his own handwriting.



"Study Chairman Mao's writings, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions."
—Lin Biao

The 4th through the 8th century was the Buddhist Age in China. Buddhism consoled the people. With the Tang dynasty (618-906 A.D.), China returned to the peace, order and stability of the Han period. Under the Tangs, the Chinese continued to excel in the arts, to make discoveries, such as the kite and wheelbarrow. It was then they developed gunpowder, but the emperor decreed it could only be used for fireworks, not in firearms, even as the dynasty finally decayed into constant warring.

Gunpowder was first used as a weapon (land mines and hand grenades) during the next major dynasty, the Sung (960-1279). The same period saw the development of some of the finest silk textiles the world has known, as well as lacquerware, lustrous green celadon and delicately fringed white porcelain. The world's first paper money was printed, and the abacus invented, a calculating device still used in the Far East today.

International trade developed, aided by the invention of the compass in 1119. China during the Sung was a great sea power. Chinese excellence in its products attracted foreigners to China's major cities on the coast, such as Canton, and Shanghai.

The Sung dynasty was an age of great poetry. The Chinese had invented moveable type in wood, porcelain and copper in 1030, a half millenium before Gutenberg printed the Bible in Europe, but it was mastery of calligraphy which was still considered of highest importance. The belief of the Chinese at this time, and even into the present day, was that the highest human was a triple master of poetry, penmanship and politics; the Confucian ideal of civilian-scholar-statesman.

But it was a time when China needed soldiers. For across the arid plains came hard riding, fierce fighting

Mongols, who pierced the crumbling ramparts of the Great Wall to become the first aliens to conquer all of China.

The unifier of the Mongol tribes, Genghis Khan ("universal ruler") established the Yüan dynasty, which means first, beginning or origin. But it was the beginning of a gradual downturn for China. It took the Mongols a generation to defeat the Chinese in the south and to sink the Sung fleet. By then, Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan, ruled a domain which stretched from Korea to the Danube. But Kublai Khan didn't innovate; he added to what already existed. He became, as the Chinese would say, a Chinese.

Kublai Khan built the high, red-walled Forbidden City of Peking, surrounding it with double walls and eight gates, a moat, parks, trees, a lake and a hill from the diggings. It was during his reign that a certain 18-year-old traveled to Cathay, as the Europeans called China, and lived in the Forbidden City. Marco Polo stayed 20 years (1275-1295), learning the language, and traveling throughout China. And perhaps never has any traveler had so great a tale to tell. For China at this time was superior to Europe in size, culture and technology. Art, inventions, and bureaucratic forms of government had found their way to Europe from China, Marco Polo discovered, not the other way around.

Meanwhile, however, the Mongols experienced seven rulers in 26 years and were finally overthrown by an uprising of exploited peasants.

A peasant gained the new Mandate of Heaven and called his dynasty Ming, meaning brilliant. And it was a brilliant era—especially for the arts. But perhaps because of resentment of the Mongols, the Chinese returned to tradition—fitting life's occasions into past experiences, without searching for new ideas. They were set in their ways. Thus, throughout 17 Ming emperors, from 1368-1644, China felt no challenge and changed very little.

But these were centuries of great ferment in Europe: the Crusades, Charlemagne, the Magna Carta, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the development of nation states. Europe was not self-contained, self-sufficient or satisfied, as was China. European sailors hence embarked on the Age of Discovery. After Vasco da Gama voyaged around Africa to India in 1498, he was followed by venturing Portuguese, who reached China in 1517.

The current situation involving mainland China and the Nationalist regime on Taiwan is not unique in the history of rebellion in China. In 1661, "Xoxinga" Cheng cheng-kung, a rebel attempting to take the throne, was pushed back to Taiwan. The Manchus, land-based people, didn't try to oust him but instead cut off supplies. Ultimately, this group and Taiwan were reabsorbed into the sphere of the Chinese mainland.



Less than 15 per cent of China's total land area can be cultivated and most of that is in the eastern third where 50 per cent of the inhabitants live

The Ming dynasty, however, was decaying, suffering from influential eunuchs and effete and feckless rulers. There were factional jealousies and natural disasters, phenomena associated with dynastic decline. Missionaries who had followed the Portuguese became influential, even converting many members of the imperial court.

More foreigners came to China's back gate; Britain's vanguard of commercial sailing vessels arrived in 1637.

The Chinese the foreigners knew, the intermediaries between East and West, were the merchants, whom the Chinese considered the lowest class—"parasites" and "traitors." Many, on top of government duties, demanded fees, percentages and presents from the foreigners.

At first, because the Europeans wanted silks and porcelain, they accepted the levies. Ultimately, however, England decided it would pay only those fees authorized by the emperor through his viceroy at Canton. And then the British decided they wanted to trade north, up the coast at Tientsien, and feelings between China and Britain worsened. In 1794, the Earl of Macartney arrived in Peking and was asked to kowtow to the emperor—the traditional tribute to the Son of Heaven. Macartney, however, would only bow to one knee, as he would in England.

The imperial dynasty was Manchu, foreigners from Manchuria, who had pretended to come to the aid of the ailing Ming dynasty in 1644 and instead had conquered Peking. Under their rule there was a gradual demoralization of the people. The army units spread throughout the land were disassociated from one another; officers were often bandits, starving their soldiers whom they had forcibly drafted. But most importantly, the Manchus were foreigners among a people slowly becoming more nationalistic.

view of history is a long one and they can wait. They will not make any agreements which compromise their independence. The days of "unequal treaties" are over. It took them 20 years to get into the United Nations. But they got in. They have waited just as long to obtain the return of Taiwan. They insist on having it. They will wait, confident that time will resolve the problem.

So there will be no quick solutions. And that will not matter. For form in China often is more important than substance. The fact that the Americans have made a great "face-saving" gesture in sending Nixon to Peking is important, perhaps more than any immediate achievements.

All this, of course, could change. Chou En-lai and the moderates in the army now are in control. The "left-

ists," who do not approve of peaceful coexistence with Americans, are in the background.

But two powerful figures have survived. They are Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and her protegee, Yao Wen-yuan. The one is the idol of China's youth, the other an accomplished propagandist. Together, once the "old guard" passes away—they are old and their ranks are thinning out—they could put together a new, more dynamic ruling combination. It is not likely to be "so gentle, so kind, or so courteous" as the present ruling group. More Cultural Revolutions could be in store.

The only thing which might head them off is a rapprochement between the United States and China that is genuine, rather than one on paper only.



Tien An Men Square in Peking



想

中华民族有同
的战到底的
自力更生的
决心

伟大的导师 伟大的领
伟大的统帅 伟大的舵手

